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Torts
by Cynthia Trimboli Adams*
and
Charles R. Adams Tr*
Elsa, soil ich dein Gatte heissen,
Soll Land und Leut' ich schirmen dir,
Soll nichts mich weider von der reissen,
Musst Eines du geloben mir:
Nie sollst du mich befragen,
Noch Wissens Sorge tragen,
Woher ich kam der Fahrt,
Noch wie mein Nam' und Art!1
The renowned composer and dramaturge Richard Wagner assimilated
several hundred years of German myth and legend into his epic "music
drama"2 Lohengrin.s Elsa, the paradigmatic damsel in distress, is
miraculously rescued by the mysterious, sword-bearing Swan Knight, on
the sole condition that, as the stranger solemnly enjoins in the passage
quoted above, she never ask him his name or his lineage.4 The climax
comes when Elsa, unable to still her doubts, demands to know her
hero's name. He reveals, "I am Lohengrin, knight of the Holy Grail.

* Assistant Solicitor, State Court of Houston County, Georgia. Of Counsel to the firm
of Adams & Adams, Fort Valley and Macon, Georgia. Oxford College of Emory University
(A.A. 1977); Emory University (B.A., M.A., 1979); Mercer University (J.D., cum laude,
1983). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Partner in the firm of Adams & Adams, Fort Valley and Macon, Georgia. Adjunct
Professor, Mercer University School of Law. University of Georgia; Mercer University
(B.A., 1980; J.D. cur laude, 1983). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. Richard Wagner, Lohengrin, act I, sc. 111 (1848).
2. Wagner came to prefer this term instead of "opera" to describe his works. See
RICHARD WAGNER, OPER UND DRAMA (1851).
3. See ERNEST NEwMAN, THE WAGNER OPERAS 105 (1949).
4. Wagner, supra note 1, act 1, sc. 3,
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My power lies in my mystery," as he sweeps away and Elsa, overcome
with grief, falls dead.'
In contrast to Elsa, our distress in dealing with the "legal Lohengrin"'
known as torts is not in knowing from whence it came, but rather in
attempting to discern where it is going. To assimilate several hundred
appellate cases into a coherent survey of Georgia tort law perhaps
requires more of the abilities of the thaumaturge than the dramaturge.
With the inspiration of the Holy Grail on some Montsalvat regrettably
remote from our endeavors, we have had to fall back on Lohengrin's
other source of strength: the cutting power of the sword (in this instance
replaced by the delete key) to sweep away all but the most epic, or
grievous, decisions. Unlike Wagner, however, we hope we have left our
subject alive.
I.
A

NEGLIGENCE

Premises Liability

In General. As usual, premises liability cases filled up a large
portion of the court reports during the current survey period. The court
of appeals repeatedly addressed the application of the "superior
knowledge" rule in premises cases. "'The true ground of liability is the
proprietor's superior knowledge of the perilous instrumentality and the
danger therefrom to persons going upon the property. It is when the
perilous instrumentality is known to the owner.., and not known to the
person injured that a recovery is permitted.'"7 Although the contemporary formulation of the superior knowledge rule coalesced in the
landmark slip and fall' case of Alterman Foods, Inc. v. Ligon,9 the court
of appeals during the survey period applied it to many other types of
premises-related injuries, denying recovery to plaintiffs who were injured

5. See id. act 3, sc. 3.
6. Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit coined this phrase in connection with the Alien
Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948). See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir.
1975).
7. Cook v. Home Depot, Inc., 214 Ga. App. 133, 134, 447 S.E.2d 35, 36 (1994)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Westbrook v. M&M Supermarkets, 203 Ga. App. 345,345,416
S.E.2d 857, 858 (1992)).
8. See infra notes 47-66 and accompanying text.
9. 246 Ga. 620, 272 S.E.2d 327 (1980).
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by alleged construction defects,1" and by alleged premises-based
distractions." The court also applied the rule to tenants,12 holding in
Rowland v. Tsay' 3 that even if the hazardous condition arguably
violated applicable building codes, a situation which can sometimes,14
but not always,"5 make the landlord guilty of negligence per se,16 the
tenant's equal knowledge of a danger (defective flooring), which she had
avoided in the past, precluded a recovery from the landlord. 7 The
court commented that "[t]o say otherwise would be to relieve tenants of
any duty of care and impose absolute liability upon landlords

. ,,,

a

situation the court was loath to countenance. In Amberley Suite Hotel
v. Soto, 9 however, the court declined to equate "knowledge of the
defect" in the premises with the legally decisive "knowledge of the
danger."0 Plaintiff in Soto was injured when a waterlogged piece of
sheetrock fell from a ceiling onto his head. He was undisputedly aware
of the existence of the defect, and, in fact, was placing a water bucket
under the ceiling.21 In view of plaintiffs lack of experience with
sheetrock and his inability to examine the extent of the structural
weakness, "[tihe conclusion as a matter of law that [he] appreciated the
danger of the ceiling falling and injuring him simply because he saw the
bulge is unwarranted,"22 said the court.2"

10. See Nelson v. Polk County Historical Society, Inc., 216 Ga. App. 756, 456 S.E.2d 93
(1995) (collapsed awning); McCurley v. Ludwig, 215 Ga. App. 798, 452 S.E.2d 554 (1994)
(collapsed roof); Brown v. Carlisle, 214 Ga. App. 483,448 S.E.2d 256 (1994) (no porch floor).
11. Kroger Co. v. Bailey, 212 Ga. App. 568, 442 S.E.2d 480 (1994) (plaintiff run over
by shopping cart while looking at defendant's bulletin board).
12. See Lonard v. Cooper & Sugrue Props., Inc., 214 Ga. App. 862, 449 S.E.2d 348
(1994).
13. 213 Ga. App. 679, 445 S.E.2d 822 (1994).
14. See Watts v. Jaffs, 216 Ga. App. 565, 455 S.E.2d 328 (1995) (handrail missing in
violation of city code; jury question on landlord's liability).
15. See Culberson v. Lanier, 216 Ga. App. 686,455 S.E.2d 385 (1995) (handrail missing
in violation of building code; landlord's liability precluded as matter of law in view of open
and obvious nature of hazard). Accord Williams v. Scruggs Co., 213 Ga. App. 470, 445
S.E.2d 287 (1994) (owner of property obstructing vision at railroad crossing not liable
absent showing the obstruction was erected in violation of some statute, code, or local
ordinance).
16. See generally O.C.G.A. § 44-7-2 (1991); Thompson v. Crownover, 259 Ga. 126, 381
S.E.2d 283 (1989); CHARLES R. ADAMS III & CYNTHIA TRIMBOLI ADAMS, GEORGIA LAW OF

TORTS, § 4-5 (1995 ed.) [hereinafter GEORGIA TORTS].
17. 213 Ga. App. at 682, 445 S.E.2d at 824.
18. Id. (quoting Hall v. Thompson, 193 Ga. App. 574, 574, 388 S.E.2d 381,383 (1989)).
19. 214 Ga. App. 72, 446 S.E.2d 778 (1994).
20. Id. at 74, 446 S.E.2d at 779.

21. Id. at 73, 446 S.E.2d at 779.
22. Id. at 74-75, 446 S.E.2d at 779-80.
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In another application of the superior knowledge rule, the court in
Strickland v. Howard24 determined that the defendant employer was
not liable for breach of his statutory duty to furnish safe machinery25
because of the undisputed evidence that plaintiff had equal knowledge
of the defect in the equipment that injured him. 26 In that situation,

Georgia has actually codified the superior knowledge rule in Official
Code section 34-7-23,27 and the court relied on that section to limit
plaintiff's recovery. 28 Plaintiff succeeded, however, in establishing his
safe work place claim.29 Such a claim is premised upon the rule that
"[ain owner or occupier of land has a duty to exercise ordinary care to
keep his premises safe for such persons, including workers who have
been hired to work on the premises, as may lawfully come on the
premises at the owner's expressed or implied invitation."" The court
in Strickland concluded that this rule gave rise to a duty on the part of
the employer to inspect the premises for possible hidden dangers,31 a
duty that the defendant employer potentially breached in that case.32
In what once would have gone without saying, the en banc court in
Scoggins v. Brown3" was constrained to hold that "[wihere parents are
watching their child play on someone else's land and the parents are
aware of a dangerous condition, it is the parents' duty, not that of the
landowner, to ensure that the child avoids the danger."34 This is a
reminder that some premises-related duties are simply nondelegable.
Licensees. By statute in Georgia,35 the owner of a premises owes
a lesser duty to one who is on the premises in the status of a licensee.3 6
The most typical type of licensee is the social guest. During the survey
period, the court held that children jumping on a neighbor's trampoline3 7 and swimming in a neighbor's pool3' were licensees, but it

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
(1994).
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
214 Ga. App. 307, 447 S.E.2d 637 (1994).
See O.C.G.A. § 34-7-20 (1992).
214 Ga. App. at 309, 447 S.E.2d at 639.
O.C.G.A. § 34-7-23 (1992).
214 Ga. App. at 309, 447 S.E.2d at 639.
Id. at 309-09, 447 S.E.2d at 639.
Howell v. Farmers Peanut Market, Inc., 212 Ga. App. 610,611,442 S.E.2d 904,905
See O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 (1982).
214 Ga. App. at 308, 447 S.E.2d at 639.
Id. at 308-09, 447 S.E.2d at 639.
215 Ga. App. 601, 451 S.E.2d 478 (1994).
Id. at 602, 451 S.E.2d at 479.
See O.C.G.A. § 51-3-2 (1982).
See GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 16, § 4-4.
Barnes v. Fulton, 213 Ga. App. 806, 446 S.E.2d 213 (1994).
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refused to say as a matter of law that a plaintiff who was visiting
defendant, a good friend of his (at least prior to the events giving rise to
this lawsuit), and giving him a hand in building a deck, was a licensee
as opposed to an invitee.3 9
One situation in which a social host may be held liable is when he is
aware of a dangerous activity going on at his party and fails to stop
it.4 This rule, however, only applies to "innocent guests'-that is,
those who are not participating in the dangerous activity.41 Defendant
in Driver v. Leicht,4" who was hosting a party at which everyone had
free access to beer on tap,43 escaped liability under this rule when one
of his guests carved up the face of plaintiff," who was also a guest, in
a fight plaintiff started over a missed pool shot. 45 "Even if a social host
is negligent," held the court, "he is not liable to an injured guest if that
active participant in the sequence of events
guest is an initiator of4or
6
resulting in his injury."
Slip and Fall. During almost a decade of surveying torts cases for
Mercer Law Review, these writers have empirically observed that only
about ten percent of the slip and fall cases in the appellate courts are
favorable to the plaintiff.47 This led these writers, in last year's torts
survey, to ask, "what does the demand reflected by all of these claims
indicate about the supply ofjustice? Are there too many frivolous claims4
in the area of premises liability, or is the legal standard too high?"

Perhaps the appellate courts are beginning to ask the same question, for
even though the current survey period yielded the typical number of slip
and fall decisions, about thirty, there was a dramatic increase in the
number that resulted in a finding that a jury question existed. 49 No
fewer than ten decisions, one-third of the total, went for the plaintiff,
and during the survey period, every appellate judge in Georgia, with the

38. Bowers v. Grizzle, 214 Ga. App. 718, 448 S.E.2d 759 (1994).
39. Scoggins v. Brown, 215 Ga. App. 601, 602, 451 S.E.2d 478, 479 (1994).
40. See Moon v. Homeowners' Ass'n, 202 Ga. App. 821, 415 S.E.2d 654 (1992).
41. Id.
42. 215 Ga. App. 694, 452 S.E.2d 165 (1994).
43. See id. at 696, 452 S.E.2d at 167 (McMurray, P.J., dissenting).
44. See id.
45. Id. at 694, 452 S.E.2d at 166.
46. Id. at 695, 452 S.E.2d at 166.
47. See, e.g., Cynthia T. Adams, et al., Torts, 45 MERCER L. REV. 403, 412 (1993)
[hereinafter 1993 Torts].
48. Cynthia T. Adams, et al., Torts, 46 MERCER L. REV. 465, 473 (1994) [hereinafter
1994 Torts].
49. See infra note 51.
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lone exception of Judge Andrews, 50 cast at least one vote for a slip and
fall plaintiff to go to a jury.51
Not every decision, however, was a plaintiff's victory, as illustrated by
the analysis in Fitzgerald v. Storer Cable Communications, Inc. 2 In
that case, plaintiff was injured when he tripped over a television cable
defendant had left across his driveway.53 "This is not a typical 'slip
and fall' case where liability is premised on ownership or control of the
premises," said the court, "[w]e must apply traditional negligence
principles to the facts."54 The court held that defendant had an
affirmative duty to act to prevent injury from the cable, because
"someone might be injured.., by tripping over the cable despite using
ordinary care."55 Nevertheless, the court affirmed summary judgment
for defendant, reasoning that plaintiffs knowledge of the hazard (the
cable had been there for about twenty months) made his own failure to
exercise care for his safety the proximate cause of his injuries.56
The supreme court's lone foray into the slip and fall area during the
survey period was Barentine v. Kroger Co. 57 Reversing the court of
appeals decision, 58 the high court held that, despite plaintiffs admission that he wasn't looking where he was going, his added explanation
that he was looking for defendant's cashier to tell him he was ready to
care for his
check out was "some evidence that [he] exercised reasonable
59
own safety in approaching the check-out counter."

50. Judge Andrews participated in the following survey period slip and fall cases, and
voted for the defendant in all of them: Stockstill v. Prime Foods Sys., Inc., 216 Ga. App.
192,453 S.E.2d 784 (1995); Ballard v. Southern Regional Med. Ctr., Inc., 216 Ga. App. 96,
453 S.E.2d 123 (1995); Wheeler/Kolb Mgt. Co. v. Poretsky, 216 Ga. App. 19,453 S.E.2d 104
(1995); Girone v. City of Winder, 215 Ga. App. 822,452 S.E.2d 794 (1994) (en bane); Talton
v. Perimeter Place Consultants, L.P., 214 Ga. App. 505, 448 S.E.2d 241 (1994); Chaves v.
Kroger, Inc., 213 Ga. App. 348, 444 S.E.2d 606 (1994) (en bane); and Paulding Mem. Med.
Ctr. v. Messaadi, 212 Ga. App. 759, 442 S.E.2d 875 (1994) (en bane).
51. See, e.g., Barentine v. Kroger Co., 264 Ga. 224, 443 S.E.2d 485 (1994) (unanimous
pro-plaintiff decision by Georgia Supreme Court); Girone v. City of Winder, 215 Ga. App.
822, 452 S.E.2d 794 (1994) (Pope, C.J., Beasley and McMurray, P.J.J., and Johnson,
Blackburn, Smith, and Ruffin, J.J., for plaintiff); Sheriff's Best Buy, Inc. v. Davis, 215 Ga.
App. 290,450 S.E.2d 319 (1994) (Birdsong, P.J., and others for plaintiff); Chaves v. Kroger,
Inc., 213 Ga. App. 348, 444 S.E.2d 606 (1994) (Cooper, J., and others for plaintiff).
52. 213 Ga. App. 872, 874-75, 446 S.E.2d 755, 758 (1994).
53. Id. at 873, 446 S.E.2d at 756.
54. Id.; 446 S.E.2d at 757.
55. Id. at 873-74, 446 S.E.2d at 757.
56. Id. at 874-75, 446 S.E.2d at 758.
57. 264 Ga. 224, 443 S.E.2d 485 (1994).
58. Kroger Co. v. Barentine, 210 Ga. App. 795, 437 S.E.2d 629 (1993), rev'd, 264 Ga.
224, 443 S.E.2d 485 (1994).
59. 264 Ga. at 225, 443 S.E.2d at 486.
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The court of appeals' reception of Barentine has, been decidedly
chilly.6" For example, Judge Blackburn, the author of the court of
appeals opinion in Barentine, wrote, "[how the passive presence of a
cashier can constitute 'the setting up of a distraction, by a sign or
conduct, which will so divert the customer's attention as to be the
proximate cause of his injury ...
'... is not explained."6 1 That court
rather summarily distinguished Barentine in several cases denying
recovery. 62 Furthermore, in Sheriff's Best Buy, Inc. v. Davis,63 the
court, speaking again through Judge Blackburn, seemed constrained to
find a jury issue against its better judgment because of Barentine.64 In
Davis, plaintiff fell while responding to a greeting from the store
manager.6 5 Because of Barentine, this made the difference to the court
of appeals:
In the subject case, the store employee spoke to Davis, while in
Barentine, there was no communication generated by the store
employee, he was simply the focus of Barentine's attention. If the
facts of Barentine establish "some evidence" that Barentine exercised
reasonable care for his own safety, then clearly Davis constitutes a

much stronger case of such evidence."
B. Malpractice
In General. For the fourth consecutive year, the expert witness
affidavit requirement of Code section 9-11-9.161 consumed a disproportionate amount of judicial resources. These writers' dismay with the
state of the law in this area is well-documented," and, happily, during
the last year a majority of the court of appeals appears to have come to

60. See, e.g., J.H. Harvey Co. v. Kinchen, 213 Ga. App. 868,870,446 S.E.2d 218,219-20
(1994).

61. Id. (quoting Alterman Foods, Inc. v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 623, 272 S.E.2d 327, 330
(1980)).

62. See Moore v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 216 Ga. App. 72, 454 S.E.2d 532 (1995)
(physical precedent only); Piggly Wiggly S., Inc. v. Weathers, 216 Ga, App. 12, 13, 453
S.E.2d 74, 75 (1994); Moore v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 214 Ga. App. 157, 160, 447 S.E.2d
122, 124 (1994).
63. 215 Ga. App. 290, 450 S.E.2d 319 (1994).
64. Id.at 291, 450 S.E.2d at 320.
65. Id. at 290, 450 S.E.2d at 319.
66. Id. at 291, 450 S.E.2d at 320.
67. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (1993).
68. See, e.g., 1993 Torts, supranote 47, at 418 ("[S]ection [9.1] is useless, self-defeating

mess. It creates far more problems than it solves, and it should be repealed ....
").
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share at least a degree of that dismay.6 9 In Johnson v. Brueckner,
the court of appeals stated the following in a panel decision requiring an
expert witness affidavit even when the defendant doctor specifically
admitted in the medical records that he was negligent:
[Elven though justice may not be served and plaintiff will be denied
her day in court, by our application of said statute in this case, [wle are
not empowered to amend the lawful acts of the legislature. Perhaps
the legislature should reconsider the appropriateness of O.C.G.A. § 911-9.1, in view of its effect on the function of the courts, which is to
dispense justice, and the unquestioned ineffectiveness of the statute in
reducing litigation. In excess of 100 cases involving O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1
have reached the appellate courts of Georgia since its inception in
1987.71

Later, in Sisk v. Patel7' a case decided after the close of this survey
period, 3 six of the court of appeals' nine judges joined in the following
resounding condemnation of the statute:
[Tihe history of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 in the appellate courts has shown
beyond a reasonable doubt that it is only with great difficulty made
workable in the practical arena of litigation, and has largely failed to
achieve its purpose of reducing frivolous litigation. Rather, it has
created an added layer of motions regarding the sufficiency of affidavits
preceding the motions for summary judgment on the merits. Rather
than continuing to interpret and reconcile subsection after subsection
added to the statute by the legislature in attempts to fix what is
fundamentally broken, the better approach is to construe pleadings
liberally to do substantial justice in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 9-1174

8(f).

Perhaps in light of the fact that it has now joined the academic
commentators 71 in public criticism of this statute, the court of appeals

69. See, e.g., Sisk v. Patel, 217 Ga. App. 156, 159-60, 456 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1995) (en

banc).
70.

216 Ga. App. 52, 453 S.E.2d 76 (1994).

71. Id. at 53-54, 455 S.E.2d at 78.
72. 217 Ga. App. 156, 456 S.E.2d 718 (1995).

73. This article surveys cases published in the advance sheets between June 1, 1994
and May 31, 1995.
74. 217 Ga. App. at 159-60, 456 S.E.2d at 720.
75. See, e.g., 1994 Torts, supra note 48, at 474; Note, Hewitt v. Kalish: Qualifying as

an "ExpertCompetent to Testify' Under O.C.G.A Section 9.11.9.1,46 MERCER L. REV. 1537,
1545 (1995).
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during the survey period made several efforts to alleviate some of the
grosser injustices occasioned by this loose cannon on the deck of Georgia
law. Space does not permit a comprehensive survey of these decisions,
but the following are a significant sample.
The most salutary development came in two cases involving Orkin
Exterminating Company. 6 In Moritz v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,"
the court held that if the statute of limitations has not expired on a
professional malpractice claim, a plaintiff who fails to file a section 9.1
affidavit with the original complaint may cure the defect by dismissing
the complaint and refiling it under the renewal statute. The court
rejected the argument that this procedure violated section 9.1(e)'s
prohibition against curing defective affidavits by amendment, because
of the language in subsection 9.1(f) which allows dismissal and refiling
within the limitations period.7 9
Subsequently, a different panel of the court of appeals approved the
same procedure in Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Carder.' The court
noted that "the Carders' first suit was not void but merely voidable, and
their renewal suit was free of the defect complained of by Orkin."8 '
Because both Moritz and Carderinvolved the complete failure to attach
an affidavit, there does not appear to be any principled reason why the
rule of those cases would not apply to cure a defective affidavit also.
The Georgia Supreme Court also weighed in on the side of a liberal
82
construction of section 9.1 in Handson v. HCA Health Services, Inc.
In that case, plaintiffs had used the affidavit of an allopathic physician
in a malpractice action against an osteopath involving a pediatric death
in an emergency room.' Although previous decisions had established
that a member of one school of medical practice was competent to testify
to the negligence of a member of a different school of practice, provided
the methods of treatment were the same,' the issue in Handson
concerned the burden of establishing the requisite professional overlap

76. Pest control operators are "professionals" for purposes of section 9.1. See Raley v.
Terminix Int'l Co., 215 Ga. App. 324, 450 S.E.2d 343 (1994).
77. 215 Ga. App. 255, 450 S.E.2d 233 (1994).

78. See O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a) (1995).
79. 215 Ga. App. at 256-57, 450 S.E.2d at 234.
80. 215 Ga. App. 257, 450 S.E.2d 217 (1994).

81. Id. at 259, 450 S.E.2d at 219.
82. 264 Ga. 293, 294, 443 S.E.2d 831, 833 (1994).
83. Id. at 294, 443 S.E.2d at 832.
84. See, e.g., Milligan v. Manno, 197 Ga. App. 171, 397 S.E.2d 713 (1990).
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of expertise.8 5 The court of appeals" had held that the affidavit must
contain evidence on this issue, and that the affidavit was insufficient for
failing to do 80.87
In reversing, the supreme court alluded to the basic public policy
reasons underlying section 9.1: "[T]o reduce the number of frivolous
malpractice suits being filed, not to force a plaintiff to prove in his
pleadings a prima facie case entitling him to a recovery."' s The court
further affirmed that, "even if an unfavorable construction of the
affidavit is possible," it "should be construed most favorably to the
plaintiff and all doubts resolved in his favor ....

."9

Following these

principles, the court held that the affidavit was sufficient: "There is
nothing to suggest that an osteopathic physician who practices emergency room medicine and an allopathic physician who practices in the same
field are trained to treat emergency patients [of this type] differently.'
The decision in Handsen, then, appears to put the burden on a
defendant who seeks to invalidate an affidavit to make an affirmative
showing that there is no professional overlap of expertise. This would
invoke the procedure prescribed in Hewett v. Kalish,91 which allows the
plaintiff to present extrinsic evidence of his expert's qualifications if the
affidavit is challenged, and allows the trial court then to decide the issue
according to ordinary summary judgment principles. 92
Almost all of this mighty expenditure of judicial resources could be
reduced to bavardage by the simple expedient of allowing amendments
to section 9.1 affidavits on terms similar to those under which amendments to pleadings are allowed after the entry of a pretrial order, when
the test is "to prevent manifest injustice."9 3 Surely the Legislature has
enough faith in the ability of trial judges to police frivolous malpractice
suits that it could take this wise step to close down this jurisprudential
sideshow.

85. 264 Ga. App. at 294, 443 S.E.2d at 832-33.
86. Deal v. Handson, 210 Ga. App. 499, 436 S.E.2d 519 (1993), rev'd sub non.
Handson v. HCA Health Servs., Inc., 264 Ga. 293, 443 S.E.2d 831 (1994).
87. 210 Ga. App. at 501, 436 S.E.2d at 520-21.
88. 264 Ga. at 294, 443 S.E.2d at 833.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 295, 443 S.E.2d at 833.
91. 264 Ga. 183, 442 S.E.2d 233 (1994),
92. Id. at 185, 442 S.E.2d at 235.
93. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-16(b) (1993). See Gaul v. Kennedy, 246 Ga. 290, 271 S.E.2d 196
(1980).
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Medical Malpractice. Whether an action is one for "medical
malpractice,"' as distinguished from ordinary negligence,95 breach of
contract, 96 or some species of intentional wrong97 was fodder for
several survey period decisions. Plaintiff in Gale v. Obstetrics &
Gynecology, PC." complained that defendants' failure to advise her
that her baby had Down's Syndrome "deprived [her] of the opportunity
to make an informed decision concerning the course of [her] pregnancy
which would have included the option of a therapeutic abortion."' The
court of appeals reasoned that "[tihough couched in terms of breach of
contract, breach of confidential relationship, and negligence, the cause
of action set forth in [plaintiffs'] complaint is, in reality, one for
wrongful birth,"'00 a species of medical malpractice action that the
Georgia courts have repeatedly declined to authorize.' 01
In the more conventional0 2 medical malpractice actions during the
survey period, the court of appeals dealt with the applicability of the
"hindsight" rule: "[A] medical malpractice defendant cannot be found
negligent on the basis of hindsight if the initial assessment was made in
accordance with reasonable standards of medical care."103 The issue
in such cases, according to the whole court in Horton v. Eaton,"4 is
"whether the negligence claim is based on later acquired knowledge or
information not known or reasonably available to the defendant

94. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-8(a) (1993) defines an "[aiction for medical malpractice" both by the
types of treatment provided ("[h]ealth, medical, dental, or surgical service, diagnosis,
prescription, treatment, or care . . .") and by the source of the provider ("any public or

private hospital, nursing home, clinic, hospital authority, facility, or institution.. ."). See
generally GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 16, § 5-2.
95. See Moore v. Louis Smith Mer. Hosp., Inc., 216 Ga. App. 299,300,454 S.E.2d 190,
192 (1995) (moving plaintiff from wheelchair to bed an act of physical strength rather than
expert medical judgment).
96. See Reaugh v. Inner Harbour Hosp., Ltd., 214 Ga. App. 259,447 S.E.2d 617 (1994).
97. See Harris v. Tatum, 216 Ga. App. 607, 455 S.E.2d 124 (1995) (battery).
98. 213 Ga. App. 614, 445 S.E.2d 366 (1994).
99. Id. at 615, 445 S.E.2d at 367.
100. Id.
101. Id. See Campbell v. United States, 962 F.2d 1579 (11th Cir. 1992); Atlanta
Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 260 Ga. 711, 398 S.E.2d 557 (1990); Spires v.
Kim, 203 Ga. App. 302, 416 S.E.2d 780 (1992).
102. See Copeland v. Houston County Hosp. Auth., 215 Ga. App. 207, 207, 450 S.E.2d
235, 236 (1994) (three elements of medical malpractice action are: (1) physician-patient
relationship (duty); (2) standard of care (breach); and (3) proximate cause/damages).
103. Yuscavage v. Jones, 213 Ga. App. 800, 803, 446 S.E.2d 209, 212 (1994).
104. 215 Ga. App. 803, 452 S.E.2d 541 (1994) (en banc).
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physician at the time the medical care was rendered."" 5 The court
seemingly limited the "reasonably available" prong of the hindsight rule
in Stokes v. CandlerHospital, Inc."6 Plaintiffs four-year-old son died
after defendant's emergency room physician, Dr. Ng, failed to diagnose
acute ischemic necrosis secondary to congenital malformation of the
mesentery. 0 7 Instead, Dr. Ng merely discharged the child after giving
him injections that stopped his vomiting and made him sleep. 0 8
Plaintiff sought to hold the hospital strictly liable under the provisions
of the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 0 9
commonly referred to as the "Anti-Patient Dumping Act.""0 Under
that Act, a hospital may be strictly liable if it fails to stabilize or
otherwise give appropriate treatment to a patient in an emergency
medical condition.'' The court of appeals in Stokes adopted an "actual
knowledge" test concerning the existence of the emergency medical
condition: "'[sItabilization' of an emergency medical condition under
the Act refers only to those ...

conditions actually diagnosed .... [Ilt

is undisputed that when the child was discharged he had stopped
vomiting and was drowsy (albeit delirious) or else '[hie was sleeping
112
most of the time,' due to the injections prescribed by Dr. Ng."
Because defendant stabilized the emergency medical condition that the
child presented, there was no basis for liability under the Act." 3
By adopting the actual knowledge test for cases under the AntiDumping Act, the court has thus applied a different standard to those
cases than to ordinary medical malpractice actions. Perhaps this can be
justified, or at least explained, by the heightened liability standard that
applies to cases under the Act."14

The supreme court's only medical malpractice opinion during the
survey period dealt with one of those procedural technicalities that this

105. Id. at 807, 452 S.E.2d at 545 (emphasis added). Compare Morse v. Flint River
Community Hosp., 215 Ga. App. 224,227,450 S.E.2d 253,257 (1994) (discrepancy between
the physician's testimony and the medical records about when he learned of plaintiffs
worsening condition supported denial of defendant's summary judgment motion).

106. 216 Ga. App. 132, 453 S.E.2d 502 (1995).
107.

Id. at 132, 453 S.E.2d at 504.

108. Id.
109.

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1995).

110. 216 Ga. App. at 133 n.1, 453 S.E.2d at 504 n.1 (citing Baber v. Hospital Corp. of
America, 977 F.2d 872, 873 n.1 (4th Cir. 1992)).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(bX1). See Urban v. King, 43 F.2d 523, 525 (10th Cir. 1994).
112. 216 Ga. App. at 134, 453 S.E.2d at 505.
113. Id. at 134-35, 453 S.E.2d at 505.
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1); Urban, 43 F.2d at 525.
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area of law is so full of."5 In Paulin u. Okehi,"' the defendant doctor produced his medical records during discovery and subsequently
acknowledged their authenticity during his- deposition." 7 When he
moved for summary judgment, plaintiffs responded with an expert
affidavit based solely on those records.'
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment based on the
general rule that uncertified medical records cannot be used to support
a summary judgment affidavit. 9 Holding that "[ilt is the policy of
this Court whenever possible to seek 'substantial justice and judicial
economy rather than strict compliance with procedural technicalities,'"
the supreme court concluded that defendant's own authentication of the
records satisfied the summary judgment requirements. 2 "We do not
imply," warned the court, "that uncertified or unsworn hospital records
alone will satisfy the requirements ...
1
Legal Malpractice. Last year's torts survey 2 2 discussed the
"somewhat sordid" case of Tante v. Herring,23 in which the supreme
court held that Tante, a lawyer who seduced his client after acquiring
information about her sex life, and who subsequently infected her with
a venereal disease that she passed on to her husband, was liable for
breach of fiduciary duty."2 Although it acknowledged that Tante's
conduct breached a canon of the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility ("CPR"), 25 and subsequently disciplined him for that,'126 the
court expressly declined to "decide whether evidence of a violation of the
disciplinary rules is relevant in a claim against a lawyer for legal

115. As one Pennsylvania judge noted about the guilty plea colloquy in criminal cases:
"[it] has become almost symbolic of the worship of technicality over substance, and is,
where not ridiculous, tragic." Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 446 A.2d 591, 598 (Pa. 1982)
(McDermott, J,, concurring).
116. 264 Ga. 604, 449 S.E.2d 291 (1994).
117. Id. at 605, 449 S.E.2d at 292.
118. Id.
119. See Paulin v. Okehi, 211 Ga. App. 752, 753, 440 S.E.2d 486, 487 rev'd, 264 Ga.
604, 449 S.E.2d 291 (1994). See generally O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(e) (1993); GEORGIA TORTS,
supra note 16, § 5-1.
120. 264 Ga. at 605, 449 S.E.2d at 293 (quoting Petkas v. Grizzard, 252 Ga. 104, 108,
312 S.E.2d 107, 110 (1984)).

121. Id. at 605 n.1, 449 S.E.2d at 292 n.1.
122. Adams, 1994 Torts, supra note 48, at 482-83.
123. 264 Ga. 694, 453 S.E.2d 686 (1994).
124. See Tante v. Herring, 211 Ga. App. 322, 323,439 S.E.2d 5, 7 (1993), rev'd in part,
264 Ga. 694, 453 S.E.2d 686 (1994).
125. 264 Ga. at 696 n.5, 453 S.E.2d at 688 n.5. See GA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, DR 4-101(BX3) (1995).
126. See In re Tante, 264 Ga. 692, 453 S.E.2d 688 (1994) (18 month suspension).
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malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty."127 Instead, the court reached
that issue with a vengeance in its landmark and potentially landscape
altering decision Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, PC. 2 '
In Allen, the court for the first time allowed the CPR to be admitted in
a legal malpractice action as evidence of the standard of care. 29
Although Presiding Justice Benham's concurrence ably analyzed the
potential adverse consequences of this decision on legal ethics and
professionalism, 3 ' that is beyond the scope of this article, and we must
confine ourselves to consideration of the tort law aspects of Allen.
The court adopted what it considered to be the majority rule in the
country, that "treats professional ethical standards as evidence of the
common law duty of care," 3 ' without establishing negligence per se or
even a presumption of negligence.3 2 Apparently,133 Allen retains the

127. 264 Ga. at 696 n.5, 453 S.E.2d at 688 n.5.
128. 265 Ga. 374, 453 S.E.2d 719 (1995).
129. Id. at 376, 453 S.E.2d at 721.
130. See id. at 377-82, 453 S.E.2d at 722-25 (Benham, P.J., concurring).
131. Id. at 375,453 S.E.2d at 721 (quoting Marc R. Greenaugh, Note, The Inadmissibility of Professional Ethical Standards in Legal Malpractice after Hizey v. Carpenter, 68
WASH. L. REv. 395, 398-99 (1993)) (emphasis omitted).
132. See id. (citing Developments in the Law-Lawyers' Responsibilities and Lawyers'
Responses, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1567 (1994)).
133. The court made the following somewhat curious observation:
Most courts do not hold that violation of the ethical guidelines creates a
presumption of negligence, although they do permit discussion of such a violation
at trial as some evidence of negligence. Expert testimony from an ethics specialist
may thus be helpful in establishing the appropriate standard of care.
Id. n.4 (quoting Developments, supra note 151, at 1567) (emphasis added). Does this mean
that there are some cases in which the court feels it may not be helpful; that introduction
of the ethical rule alone would be sufficient to support a jury verdict of negligence? If
"ethics is that which is required," why is introduction of the relevant ethical rule not
tantamount to calling the entire State Bar of Georgia as expert witnesses? Compare
Francis v. Reynolds, 215 Ga. App. 418, 418, 450 S.E.2d 876, 877 (1994), in which the court
of appeals held that the findings of the Georgia Board of Dentistry would not be admissible
in a malpractice action arising out of the same facts, because it would relieve plaintiff of
her legal burden of proving at trial the applicable standard of care and defendant's
deviation from it. The court in Francis concluded with the following statement that
appears to be at odds with the rationale of Allen:
Moreover, we do not think this harm could be cured even if the jury was
instructed that it was free to reject the findings of the Board on the standard of
care issue. At a minimum the jury would give the Board's findings the same
weight as it would that of testimony offered by expert witnesses. This would
clearly be prejudicial to defendant, who would have no opportunity to crossexamine the members of the Board as it would other experts testifying at trial.
Id.at 419, 450 S.E.2d at 877.
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general requirement134 for proof by expert testimony of the standard
of care and the defendant's deviation therefrom, and the court further
limited the sweep of its holding by the requirement that the "Bar Rule
[in question] must be intended to protect a person in the plaintiffis
position or
be addressed to the particular harm suffered by the
135
plaintiff."
The Georgia Supreme Court in Allen has taken on an extremely
delicate balancing problem. On the one hand, as Justice Benham
recognized, the decision presents the risk of treating the legal profession
worse than "professions with little or no code of ethics."13
"On the
other hand, given the court's acknowledgment that lawyers' [e]thical
rules . . . 'can be regarded as a subspecies of legislation-rules that
differ from law only in that their enforcement is relatively informal,'"37 the court has arguably treated negligent attorneys better
than other tortfeasors whose conduct violates a statute, ordinance, or
regulation and therefore constitutes negligence per se.' 3s It remains
to be seen how the court will resolve the legal dilemma it has here
created.
II.
A

IMPUTED AND RELATIONAL LIABILITY

Alcohol

In Ihesiaba v. Pelletier,139 the court of appeals affirmed the applicability of Georgia's statutory "dram shop"140 scheme to employees in a
somewhat offbeat factual setting. 14'
Defendant held a company
Christmas party at which everyone celebrated rather freely. Defendant
hired plaintiff, a limousine operator, to take him and several of the boys
from the party to a local pub for further drinks. Unfortunately, things
got out of hand and the pub owners found it necessary to throw the boys

134. See, e.g., Barr v. Johnson, 189 Ga. App. 136, 375 S.E.2d 51 (1988); Cynthia T.
Adams, et al., Torts 42 MERCER L. REv. 481, 441 (1990).
135. 265 Ga. at 377, 453 S.E.2d at 721-22.
136. Id. at 381, 453 S.E.2d at 724 (Benham, P.J., concurring).
137. Id. at 377 n. 5,453 S.E.2d at 721 n.5 (quoting G. HAZARD, ETHICS INTHE PRACTICE
OF LAW 2 (1978), reprinted in G. HAZARD & S. KENIAH, THE LAW AND ETHICs OF
LAWYERING (1990)).
138. See, e.g., Cheevers v. Clark, 214 Ga. App. 866, 449 S.E.2d 528 (1994); GEORGIA
TORTS, supra note 16, § 3-6.
139. 214 Ga. App. 721, 448 S.E.2d 920 (1994).
140. See O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40 (Supp. 1995). For a definition of "dram shop" acts
generally, see GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 16, § 6-2.
141. 214 Ga. App. at 725-26, 448 S.E.2d at 923-24.
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out. Defendant paid plaintiff to take the boys home, and, at some point
142
on the way, the boys worked plaintiff over, slicing his cornea in two. 3
The court of appeals, holding the statutory scheme of liability
applicable to employers,1" went on to affirm the trial court's ruling
that defendant had discharged his duty by arranging for the employees
to be transported home to keep them from driving. 4 ' Defendant owed
no duty to plaintiff to control the employees in their conduct outside the
scope of their employment, said the court.'" Nor was this third-party
criminal attack on plaintiff reasonably foreseeable to defendant, it
concluded. 147
B. Master and Servant-Workers' Compensation Bar
The general statutory bar to an injured employee's tort recovery
against an employer14 seemingly was expanded in Hennly v. Richardson.1 49 Plaintiff in that case sought to recover from her employer for
battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on her
allegations that defendant Hennly, a co-worker, deliberately directed his
pipe smoke at her."' ° Despite the fact that prior cases had held
workers' compensation immunity did not shield either intentional
torts' or nonphysical injuries, 112 the supreme court, adopting a
broad reading of the compensation bar,'53 held that plaintiff's problems were a part of her work environment: "[Tihough Hennley's actions
may have been, on occasion, intentional, those actions, when viewed in
the context of the complaint and the broad scope of [Code section] 34-9-

142. Id. at 721-22, 448 S.E.2d at 921.
143. In pertinent part, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(b) provides that one who furnishes alcoholic
beverages to a noticeably intoxicated person, knowing that person will soon be driving a
motor vehicle, may have vicarious liability for injuries that person causes. See 1994 Torts,
supra note 48, at 486.
144. 214 Ga. App. at 724,448 S.E.2d at 922 (citing Pirkle v. Hawley, 199 Ga. App. 371,
405 S.E.2d 71 (1991); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Altman, 183 Ga. App. 611, 359
S.E.2d 385 (1987)).
145. See id. at 723, 448 S.E.2d at 922.
146. Id. at 725, 448 S.E.2d at 923.
147. Id.
148. See O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11 (1992 & Supp. 1995); GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 16, § 7-7.
149. 264 Ga. 355, 444 S.E.2d 317 (1994).
150. See Richardson v. Hennly, 209 Ga. App. 868, 871, 434 S.E.2d 772, 775 (1993),
rev 'd, 264 Ga. 355, 444 S.E.2d 317 (1994).
151. See Kennedy v. Pineland State Bank, 211 Ga. App. 375, 439 S.E.2d 106 (1993);
Griggs v. All-Steel Bldgs., Inc., 209 Ga. App. 253, 433 S.E.2d 89 (1993).
152. See Oliver v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 209 Ga. App. 703, 434 S.E.2d 500 (1993).
153. See 264 Ga. at 356 n.1, 444 S.E.2d at 320 n.1.
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11, are4 insufficient to take this claim out from under the coverage of the

Act.

15

III.

A.

TORT DEFENSES

Proximate Cause Defenses
The supreme court in Mixon v. City of Warner Robins155 granted

certiorari to the court of appeals in that case'"" for the purpose of
determining whether a police officer's pursuit of a fleeing criminal
suspect can be considered the proximate cause of injuries sustained by
a third party from a collision with the fleeing suspect's vehicle.' 7
The high court first analyzed this question from the mandates set forth
in Code section 40-6-6,'58 which provides that the traffic violation
exceptions accorded to the operation of emergency vehicles do not relieve
the drivers of such vehicles from "the duty to drive with due regard for
the safety of all persons."'59 As a result of this analysis the court
concluded that when an officer's act of pursuit is performed without the
requisite due regard for the safety of others, he may be found liable for
any injuries inflicted upon a third party by the suspect under chase.16
Thus, in these circumstances the intervening acts of the fleeing criminal
did not break the necessary chain of causal events."8 '
The issue of proximate cause most frequently presents itself in relation
to the foreseeability of intervening criminal conduct on a particular
premises. During this survey period the court deemed the foreseeability
issue, which can translate into liability for the premises owner, to be a

154. Id. This whole scenario, of course, should instantly remind every reader of
Macbeth's second-guessing his plot to murder King Duncan: "And pity, like a naked newborn babe ...

shall blow the horrid deed in every eye ....

" William Shakespeare,

Macbeth, act 1, sc. 7 (Signet Classic ed., Signet Books 1963) (1606).
155. 264 Ga. 385, 444 S.E.2d 761 (1994).
156. Mixon v. City of Warner Robins, 209 Ga. App. 414, 434 S.E.2d 71 (1993), rev'd,
264 Ga. 385, 444 S.E.2d 761 (1994).
157. 264 Ga. at 385, 444 S.E.2d at 763.
158. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6 (1994).
159. 264 Ga. at 386-87, 444 S.E.2d at 763-64. See O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(d) (1994).
160. 264 Ga. at 388, 444 S.E.2d at 764.
161. Id. It should be noted that in response to Mixon, the Georgia General Assembly
in 1995 amended O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6 (1994), to provide that when a law enforcement officer
is pursuing a fleeing suspect and that suspect causes injury to another person, the
"officer's pursuit shall not be the proximate cause or a contributing proximate cause of
the damage, injury, or death caused by the fleeing suspect unless the law enforcement
officer acted with reckless disregard for proper law enforcement procedures in the officer's
decision to initiate or continue the pursuit." O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(d)(2) (Supp. 1995).

328

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

jury question in Days Inn ofAmerica, Inc. v. Matt. 6 ' In that case, the
court held that an armed robbery in the hotel parking lot was substantially similar to numerous other crimes committed in the same area."'3
Likewise, in Killebrew v. Sun Trust Banks, Inc., M which involved an
attempted armed robbery at an automatic teller location, the court found
potential liability for the premises owner where a prior similar incident
had occurred.16
B. Limitation of Actions
The case of Love v. Whirlpool Corp.'6 presented the supreme court
with a question concerning the constitutionality of Georgia's products
liability statute of repose 167 that bars all strict liability and negligence
complaints not brought within ten years from the alleged defective
product's first sale for use or consumption.1 6 ' The court likened the
classifications presented in this statute to those of the medical malpractice statute of repose6 9 passed upon during 1993 in Craven v. Lowndes
County HospitalAuthority, 7 ' and predictably found them to be neither
arbitrary nor unreasonable.' 71 Concerning this same statute of repose,
however, the high court in Chrysler Corp. v. Batten172 held that failureto-warn causes of action are excluded from the limitations imposed by
this statute, "thereby precluding [its) use ...

to relieve manufacturers

of their liability for failing to warn of a danger arising from the use of
a product
whenever that danger becomes known to the manufactur173
ers."
162. 265 Ga. 235, 454 S.E.2d 507 (1995).
163. Id. at 236, 454 S.E.2d at 508.
164. 216 Ga. App. 159, 453 S.E.2d 752 (1995).
165. Id. at 160, 453 S.E.2d at 753. In the following survey period cases, the lack of
foreseeability of the third party's conduct broke the causal chain of liability: Ritz Carlton
Hotel Co. v. Revel, 216 Ga. App. 300, 454 S.E.2d 183 (1995) (no previous incidents of
violent crime committed against anyone on hotel premises); J.C. Penny Co. v. Spivey, 215
Ga. App. 680, 452 S.E.2d 191 (1994) (previous purse snatching in parking lot not
substantially similar to theft at mall entrance); Ihesiaba v. Pelletier, 214 Ga. App. 721, 448
S.E.2d 920 (1994) (no evidence shown that defendant knew that intoxicated persons had
physically attacked anyone or had any ill will toward plaintiff).
166. 264 Ga. 701, 449 S.E.2d 602 (1994).
167. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 (Supp. 1995).
168. 264 Ga. at 703, 449 S.E.2d at 605.
169. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71(b) (Supp. 1995).
170. 263 Ga. 657, 437 S.E.2d 308 (1993).
171. 264 Ga. at 703, 449 S.E.2d at 605, For a discussion of Craven, see 1994 Torts,
supra note 48, at 494.
172. 264 Ga. 723, 450 S.E.2d 208 (1994).
173. Id. at 727, 450 S.E.2d 213. This holding was predicated upon the following
language in O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(c) (Supp. 1995): "Nothing contained in this subsection shall
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As in Wright v. Robinson,174 in which the supreme court found that
the medical malpractice statute of repose discussed above barred a
renewal action.. brought after its expiration,'7 6 in Love the court
similarly found that the products liability statute of repose acts as a bar
to any and all such renewal actions.17 7 The court of appeals further
noted in a case of first impression, Gwinnett Place Associates, L.P v.
PharrEngineering,Inc.,7 that a statute of ultimate repose will serve
is brought
to thwart a third-party complaint for indemnification which
7
after the expiration of the applicable period of repose.1 1
Two medical malpractice cases decided during the survey period, Beck
v. Denniss ° and Bynum v. Gregory,'' found a jury question to exist
concerning the well-settled principle that a physician's fraud in dealing
with a patient will prevent the applicable statute of repose from
insulating the physician from liability." 2 In Beck, defendant doctor
admitted that he knew a piece of nasal packing had been left in plaintiff
Beck's nose following facial surgery he had performed, but he never
informed Beck or any of Beck's other doctors about this condition.
Seven years (and many sinus problems) later, another physician
discovered and removed the offensive packing.' Defendant in Bynum,
in response to Bynum's direct questioning, gave Bynum a false
diagnosis of spinal meningitis in reference to her infant daughter's
condition at birth. Sixteen years later Bynum learned from another
physician that her daughter had never had spinal meningitis, but that
her problems resulted from a brain injury due to a lack of oxygen at
birth.'84 The trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
defendants was reversed in both of these cases. 'The statute of ultimate
repose should not [be allowed to] provide an incentive for a doctor or
other medical professional to conceal his or her negligence with the

relieve a manufacturer from the duty to warn of a danger arising from use of a product
once that danger becomes known to the manufacturer." 264 Ga. at 727, 450 S.E.2d at 213.
174. 262 Ga. 844, 426 S.E.2d 870 (1993).
175. See O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a) (Supp. 1995).
176. See 1993 Torts, supra note 47, at 429-30; see also Burns v. Radiology Assocs., P.C.,
214 Ga. App. 76, 446 S.E.2d 788 (1994).
177. 264 Ga. at 705-06, 449 S.E.2d at 607.
178. 215 Ga. App. 53, 449 S.E.2d 889 (1994).
179. Id. at 55, 449 S.E.2d at 891.
180. 215 Ga. App. 728, 452 S.E.2d 205 (1994).
181. 215 Ga. App. 431, 450 S.E.2d 840 (1994).
182. Id. at 842, 450 S.E.2d at 842; 215 Ga. App. at 729, 452 S.E.2d at 206. See Lasoya
v. Sunay, 193 Ga. App. 814, 389 S.E.2d 339 (1989); Hill v. Fordham, 186 Ga. App. 354, 367
S.E.2d 128 (1988).
183. 215 Ga. App. at 729, 452 S.E.2d at 206.
184. 215 Ga. App. at 432-33, 450 S.E.2d at 841-42.
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assurance that after five years such fraudulent conduct will insulate him
or her from liability. The sun never sets on fraud.""
The statutory prerequisite to bringing a claim against a municipality
is the giving of written notice of the claim to the governing authority
within six months from the date of the accrual of the cause of action.186
A problem ensued in City of Chamblee v. Maxwell" 7 when plaintiff
sought to bring a suit against defendant municipality for a continuing
trespass and nuisance that caused property damage more than six
months prior to the giving of the required ante litem notice."'s Although plaintiff filed his complaint within the applicable four-year
limitations period,"8 9 the court specifically held that
a property owner who incurs damage as a result of a continuing
nuisance or trespass maintained by a municipality is entitled, within
the four-year period of limitations, to recover only those damages
incurred during the six months preceding the giving of [the ante litem]
notice. The recovery of any damages incurred prior thereto would be
barred, where no timely [ante litem] notice of a claim therefor was
given ..... 9

This case overruled both Vickers v. City of Fitzgerald9 ' and City of
Gainesville v. Moss'92 to the extent that their rulings were inconsistent
with the ruling set forth above. 93
Because there is no "discovery rule" in Georgia for property damage
claims, the statute of limitations for such causes of action begins to run
on the date the wrong is committed regardless of when the injured party
discovers the wrongdoing."
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
in Tucker v. Southern Wood Piedmont Co.'9 ' ruled, however, that for
property damage due to toxic substance pollution, federal law mandates
a limitations commencement date of the time when a plaintiff knows or
reasonably should know that the damages incurred resulted from

185. Hill v. Fordham, 186 Ga. App. 354, 358, 367 S.E.2d 128, 131-32 (1988).
186. O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5 (1993).
187. 264 Ga. 635, 452 S.E.2d 488 (1994).

188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 635, 452 S.E.2d at 489.
See O.C.G.A. § 9-3-30 (1982).
264 Ga. at 637, 452 S.E.2d at 491.
216 Ga. 476, 117 S.E.2d 316 (1960), overruled,264 Ga. 635,452 S.E.2d 488 (1994).

192.

108 Ga. App. 713, 134 S.E.2d 547 (1963), overruled, 264 Ga. 635, 452 S.E.2d 488

(1994).
193. 264 Ga. at 638, 452 S.E.2d at 491.
194. See Corporation of Mercer Univ. v. National Gypsum Co., 258 Ga. 365, 366, 368
S.E.2d 732, 733 (1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 965 (1989); Griffin v. Kangaroo, Inc., 208 Ga.
App. 190, 192, 430 S.E.2d 82, 84 (1993).
195. 28 F.3d 1089 (11th Cir. 1994).
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contamination by a hazardous substance.19 6 Thus, when determining
the applicable statute of limitations for this narrow range of state
property damage claims, federal law, in effect, now imposes a discovery
rule.
Finally, it should be noted that the 1995 Georgia General Assembly
gave some good news to plaintiffs with injuries compensable by both
workers' compensation benefits and third party tort claims.'
Under
the old law such plaintiffs were required to bring their personal injury
suits against third parties within a statutorily-shortened one year period
or suffer a forced assignment of the claim to their employers.19 The
amended version gives a plaintiff the full benefit of the applicable
limitations period in which to bring his third-party claim, but still allows
the employer (with notice to the plaintiff) to bring the claim if the
plaintiff has not done so within one year from the injury date.'
In
addition, the legislature expressly stated that these new provisions
would apply to all injuries incurred on or after July 1, 1992."°
C.

Assumption of the Risk
The court of appeals in Turner v. Sumter Self Storage Co.,201 reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendant and
determined that a jury question was presented concerning whether
plaintiff had assumed the risk of his injuries. Plaintiff was injured at
a construction site by a swinging cement chute as he was working
behind and with his back to a cement truck.0 2 Relying on the fact
that knowledge of the apparent danger is an essential element for
assuming the risk of such danger,0 3 the court found that there was no
evidence in the record that the cement chute had ever swung while
pouring concrete nor was there any evidence that plaintiff knew of any
occasion when the chute had slipped and struck someone."'

196. Id. at 1093. See 42 U.S.C. § 9658 (1995).
197. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1(c) (Supp. 1995).
198. Id. § 34-9-11.1(c) (1992). The general statute of limitations period for personal
injuries is two years from the accrual of the right of action. Id. § 9-3-33.
199. Id. § 34-9-11.1(c) (Supp. 1995). If the employee brings the third-party suit, the
employer retains a limited right of subrogation. Id.
200. Id. § 34-9-11.1(e).
201. 215 Ga. App. 92, 449 S.E.2d 618 (1994).
202. Id. at 92-93, 449 S.E.2d at 619.
203. See Beringause v. Fogleman Truck Lines, Inc., 200 Ga. App. 822, 409 S.E.2d 524
(1991); Fillis Enters., Inc. v. Jones, 168 Ga. App. 59, 308 S.E.2d 7 (1983).
204. 215 Ga. App. at 95, 449 S.E.2d at 621. In the following survey period cases,
however, the court determined as a matter of law that the plaintiffs had assumed the risk
of the obvious dangers presented: Sewell v. Dixie Region Sports Car Club of Am., Inc., 215
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D. Delay in Service
The supreme court's grant of certiorari in Hobbs v. Arthur °.
breathed the breath of life back into several earlier decisions which had
been overruled by the court of appeals' decision in that case.2"' The
court of appeals had previously ruled that when a renewal action is
filed,2 °7 the question of diligence in perfecting service will relate back
to the time of service in the original action regardless of the timeliness
of service in the renewed action.2 "° The supreme court reversed this
ruling and held that as long as the original action was valid, diligence
in perfecting service in a subsequently dismissed and refiled action
"must be measured from the time of filing the renewed suit, [and] any
delay in service in a valid first action is not available as an affirmative
defense in the renewal action."20 9

E. Immunity
The supreme court's review of Gilbert v. Richardson210 resulted in
a partial affirmance and partial reversal of the court of appeals decision

Ga. App. 611, 451 S.E.2d 489 (1994) (plaintiffs decedent was killed by an out-of-control
vehicle after voluntarily remaining in a restricted area at a drag race); Roberts v. Carter,
214 Ga. App. 540, 448 S.E.2d 239 (1994) (plaintiff, an experienced car mechanic, was
injured while working beneath a truck hoisted with a chain); Barnes v. Fulton, 213 Ga.
App. 806,446 S.E.2d 213 (1994) (fourth grader was injured while jumping on a trampoline).
205. 264 Ga. 359, 444 S.E.2d 322 (1994).
206. See Hobbs v. Arthur, 209 Ga. App. 855,434 S.E.2d 748 (1993), rev d, 264 Ga. 359,
444 S.E.2d 322 (1994). The previously overruled (and subsequently revived) cases
specifically included Collier v. Marsh, 203 Ga. App. 322, 416 S.E.2d 849 (1992) and Jones
v. Cropps, 197 Ga. App. 313, 398 S.E.2d 295 (1990).
207. See O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61 (1982 & Supp. 1995).
208. Hobbs v. Arthur, 209 Ga. App. 855, 857-58, 434 S.E.2d 748, 750-51 (1993).
209. 264 Ga. at 360-61, 444 S.E.2d at 323 (footnote omitted). See also Urrea v. Flythe,
215 Ga. App. 212, 450 S.E.2d 266 (1994). Cases decided during the survey period in which
it was determined that the respective plaintiffs failed to use due diligence in perfecting
service included the following: Day v. Savage, 213 Ga. App. 792, 446 S.E.2d 220 (1994)
(plaintiff neither provided addresses for service nor did anything else to see that service
was accomplished); Lawrence v. Noltimier, 213 Ga. App. 628, 445 S.E.2d 378 (1994)
(service not perfected until 166 days after expiration of statute of limitations-plaintiff did
nothing to locate defendant until after statute had run and failed to show a lack of periods
during which nothing was done to accomplish service); Devoe v. Callis, 212 Ga. App. 618,
442 S.E.2d 765 (1994) (service not perfected until 81 days after expiration of statute of
limitations-after being placed on notice of a problem with defendant's address a
significant time period elapsed before plaintiff initiated investigation activity, also no
detailed record presented of what was done to locate defendant).
210. 264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994).
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in that case21 as it was discussed in last year's survey.2 12 In harmony with the court of appeals, the supreme court determined that the
1991 constitutional language extending almost complete sovereign
immunity to the state and its departments and agencies21 was
applicable to counties.2 14 In addition, the supreme court specifically
stated that "[tihe enactment of a state tort claims act was but one of the
ways the legislature could constitutionally waive sovereign immunity,"2"' thereby affirming the viability of Georgia code section 33-24-51,
which allows a waiver of sovereign immunity when a county purchases
liability insurance for the negligence of any agent or employee while
using a motor vehicle.216 Unlike the court of appeals, however, the
supreme court held that the county's participation in the Georgia
Interlocal Risk Management Agency does constitute liability insurance
for sovereign immunity waiver purposes, as this court had previously
decided in Hiers v. City of Barwick."'
Although most claims against the State must now be brought
pursuant to the Georgia Tort Claims Act, 218 a sovereign immunity
defense does not protect the State against injunctive relief for acting
219 In IBM Corp. v. Evans, 221
outside the scope of lawful authority.
plaintiff sought injunctive relief against defendant state agency for the
wrongful award of a computer system contract to another company. The
court reviewed the sovereign immunity issue in relation to plaintiff's
claim that it was not given the correct number of evaluation points it
was told it would receive and held that "sovereign immunity does not
stand as a bar to [plaintiffs] complaint, and injunctive relief may be
granted if [defendant state agency] acted without lawful authority and
beyond the scope of its official power in the manner in which it
" '
Concerning the claim notice
evaluated [plaintiffs] proposal."22

211. Gilbert v. Richardson, 211 Ga. App. 795, 440 S.E.2d 684, aff'd in part & revd
in part, 264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994).
212. 1994 Torts, supra note 48, at 499.
213. GA, CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9.
214. 264 Ga. at 747, 452 S.E.2d at 479. During this survey period the court of appeals
also determined that the 1991 sovereign immunity amendment language discussed above
specifically applies to county-wide school districts. Coffee County Sch. Dist. v. Snipes, 216
Ga. App. 293, 454 S.E.2d 149 (1995).
215. 264 Ga. at 748, 452 S.E.2d at 480.
216. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 (1990).
217. 262 Ga. 129, 414 S.E.2d 647 (1992).
218. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-20 et seq. (1994).
219. See DeKalb County v. Townsend Assocs., 243 Ga. 80, 252 S.E.2d 498 (1979);
Chilivis v. National Distrib. Co., 239 Ga. 651, 238 S.E.2d 431 (1977).
220. 265 Ga. 215, 453 S.E,2d 706 (1995).
221. Id. at 217, 453 S.E.2d at 709.
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provision of the Georgia Tort Claims Act,222 it should be noted that the
court in Hardy v. Candler County22 specifically held that the requisite
notice must actually be received within the twelve month statutorilyallowed4 period from the date a loss was or should have been discov-

ered.

22

During this survey period, the court of appeals in Landis v. Rockdale
County22 was, once again, directed to reconsider an earlier decision in
that case226 in light of the special duty/special relationship factors
227 In
enunciated by the supreme court in City of Rome v. Jordan.
Landis a deputy sheriff observed, but did not arrest, a noticeably
intoxicated driver. Approximately two hours later the drunk driver was
involved in a traffic accident in which plaintiffs decedent was fatally
injured. 228 The court of appeals, in its reconsideration of this case,
found that pursuant to Jordan the deputy had no duty to arrest the
drunk driver for the protection of the general public.229 The court
further found that there was no special relationship created between the
deputy and plaintiff's decedent as a result of the deputy's limited
contact with only the drunk driver several hours prior to the accident;
nor was there any special relationship created between the deputy and
the drunk driver since the deputy had never exercised any control over
the driver.230
Interesting questions concerning both charitable immunity and Good
Samaritan immunity were also addressed during this survey period.
The court in Bagley v. Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority23 ' held that
institutions which are entitled to assert the defense of charitable
immunity 23 2 may not lawfully, by any agreement or contract, extend

222. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(aX1) (1994).
223. 214 Ga. App. 627, 448 S.E.2d 487 (1994).

224. Id. at 631, 448 S.E.2d at 490.
225.

212 Ga. App. 700, 445 S.E.2d 264 (1994).

226. Landis v. Rockdale County, 206 Ga. App. 876, 427 S.E.2d 286 (1992).
227. 263 Ga. 26, 426 S.E.2d 861 (1993). In order for a "special relationship" to exist,
the following requirements must be met: (1) an explicit assurance, through promises or
actions, that action would be taken on behalf of the injured party; (2) knowledge that
inaction could lead to harm; and (3) justifiable and detrimental reliance by the injured

party that there would be an affirmative undertaking. Id. at 29, 426 S.E.2d at 863. For
a discussion of other cases reconsidered in light of the decision in City of Rome, see 1994
Torts, supra note 51, at 498-99.
228. 212 Ga. App. at 700, 445 S.E.2d at 265.
229. Id. at 703, 445 S.E.2d at 268.
230. Id. at 703-04, 445 S.E.2d at 268.
231.

216 Ga. App. 537, 455 S.E.2d 325 (1995).

232. For a further discussion of charitable immunity, see GEORGIA TORTS, supra note
16, § 21-10.
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this immunity to cover the tortious acts of their individual employ-

ees. 233 In addition, as announced by the court in Johnson v. Gwinnett
County,2 4 Good Samaritan immunity 5 cannot be waived through
the purchase of liability insurance by any persons to whom this
immunity otherwise applies.
F

Releases
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals presented the Georgia Supreme
Court in U.S. Anchor Manufacturing, Inc. v. Rule Industries, Inc. 2 5
with certified questions concerning the effects of a general release from
liability on certain subsequent, injury-producing acts. 237 The supreme
court gave a two-part answer to the Eleventh Circuit. First, a general
release from civil liability, according to the supreme court, does not
discharge liability for injuries caused by new post-release acts done in
the course of a scheme or conspiracy that was ongoing when the release
was executed.238 Second, in order for a general release to discharge
liability for unknown prerelease tortious conduct, it must specifically
indicate such an intent.3 9
Contracts that seek to release or limit liability on issues of public
interest or policy are generally unenforceable. 240 Defendant in Reaugh
v. Inner Harbour Hospital, Ltd.,241 entered into a contract with
plaintiff's parents to provide medical and educational services to
plaintiff, then a minor. In the same contract, defendant also sought to
exculpate itself from liability for any harm that resulted to plaintiff in
providing or failing to provide such services to her.242 The court found
that in this situation in which parents had entrusted the care, custody,

233. 216 Ga. App. at 540, 455 S.E.2d at 328.
234. 215 Ga. App. 79, 449 S.E.2d 856 (1994).
235, See O.C.G.A. § 31-11-8 (1991). This statutory immunity defense provides that
[a]ny person, including agents and employees, who is licensed to furnish
ambulance service and who in good faith renders emergency care to a person who
is a victim of an accident or emergency shall not be liable for any civil damages
to such victim as a result of any act or omission by such person in rendering such
emergency care to such victim.
236. 264 Ga. 295, 443 S.E.2d 833 (1994).
237. Id. at 296-97, 443 S.E.2d at 834-35.
238. Id. at 297-98, 443 S.E.2d at 835. The release in U.S. Anchor contained liabilitydischarging language that was construed to apply only to prerelease acts. The subsequent
injuries did not result from a continuation of the prerelease acts, but were the effects of
new postrelease acts.
239. Id. at 298, 443 S.E.2d at 836.
240. See generally GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 16, § 23-1.
241. 214 Ga. App. 259, 447 S.E.2d 617 (1994).
242. Id. at 259, 447 S.E.2d at 618.
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and control of their child to defendant, such a liability-limiting
contractual provision is contrary to public policy and therefore void.243
Plaintiffs in Thornton v. Ware County Hospital Authority4 4 sought
to pursue their medical malpractice action against the remaining joint
tortfeasor defendants after entering into a covenant not to sue and
dismissing the suit against two other joint tortfeasors. The trial court
ruled that plaintiffs' claims against the remaining defendants were
barred because of the release of the other joint tortfeasors. 45 Finding
that the dismissal served only as an adjudication of nonliability and not
as an adjudication of the question of negligence, the court of appeals
would have allowed the trial to proceed against the remaining joint
tortfeasors.2 46 At the trial of Hyde v. Fulton County HospitalAuthority2 47 the jury brought back a verdict in favor of one joint tortfeasor

defendant and a judgment amount against the other joint tortfeasor
defendant. The luckless defendant tendered the full judgment amount
to plaintiffs, after which plaintiffs sought to appeal the verdict in favor
of the other defendant.2 4' The court of appeals dismissed the appeal
and stated that plaintiffs' acceptance of the full judgment amount
estopped them from appealing the verdict in favor of the more fortunate
defendant.249
IV.

A.

OTHER TORT CAUSES OF ACTION

ProductsLiability
The supreme court's decision in Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc.210 is

surely to be reckoned as the most significant Georgia products liability
decision in a generation. Banks brought Georgia into line with an
243. Id. at 261, 447 S.E.2d at 619-20.
244. 215 Ga. App. 276, 450 S.E.2d 260 (1994).
245. Id. at 276-77, 450 S.E.2d at 261.
246. Id. at 278, 450 S.E.2d at 262. The trial court's decision ultimately was affirmed
on the issue of respondeat superior. Id. at 279-80, 450 S.E.2d at 263. If the trial had
proceeded against the remaining defendants, they, presumably, could have brought a thirdparty complaint for contribution against the dismissed defendants for any judgment
amount above what had been previously paid to plaintiffs. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-14 (1993).
247. 215 Ga. App. 732, 452 S.E.2d 517 (1994).
248. Id. at 732, 452 S.E.2d at 518.
249. Id. at 732-33, 452 S.E.2d at 518. If plaintiffs wanted to appeal the jury's verdict,
they would have been required to do so against both defendants instead of accepting the
total money judgment from one and hoping the other would have to ante up later, without

a risk to their money already in hand. "Be on your guard against all kinds of greed; a
man's life does not consist in the abundance of his possessions." Luke 12:15 (New
International).
250. 264 Ga. 732, 450 S.E.2d 671 (1994).
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emerging national consensus"' by adopting risk-utility analysis in

cases involving defective product design. 2 Recognizing that "the term
'defect' in design defect cases is an expression of the legal conclusion
to be reached, rather than a test for reaching that conclusion,"" 3 the
court deemed "a balancing test whereby the risks inherent in a product

design are weighed against the utility or benefit derived from the

product"2" to be the appropriate means for arriving at that conclusion.
In doing so, the court struck, at least in part, two landmarks from the
Georgia products liability scene by disapproving both Center Chemical
Co. v. Parzini5 5 and Mann v.Coast CatamaranCorp.256 to the extent
they are inconsistent with the new analysis. Both Parzini and Mann
were grounded on a consumer expectations model of products liability,
which resulted in the rule that if a product was "properly prepared,
manufactured, packaged and accompanied with adequate warnings and
instructions,"" and nothing prevented it "from functioning properly
in its intended use,"258 it was not 'defective' in the contemplation of
Georgia's strict products liability statute,25 despite evidence of
alternative safer designs.
Banks, in essence, has added a second story to the products liability
60
"house." By reducing consumer expectations to one of many factors

251. See, e.g. Preliminary Draft No. 1 (Apr. 20, 1993) Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability § 10L
252. 264 Ga. at 735, 450 S.E.2d at 674.
253. Id. at 734, 450 S.E.2d at 673.
254. Id.
255. 234 Ga. 868, 218 S.E.2d 580 (1975), overruled in part, 264 Ga. 732, 734, 450
S.E.2d 671, 673 (1994).
256. 254 Ga. 201, 326 S.E.2d 436 (1985), overruled in part, 264 Ga. 732, 734, 450
S.E.2d 671, 673 (1994).
257. Parzini, 234 Ga. at 870, 218 S.E.2d at 582.
258. Mann, 254 Ga. at 202, 326 S.E.2d at 437.
259. See O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(1982 & Supp. 1995) ("The manufacturer... shall be liable
in tort, irrespective of privity, to any natural person ...who suffers injury... because the
property when sold by the manufacturer was not merchantable and reasonably suited to
the use intended.....") (emphasis added).
260.
These factors include: the usefulness of the product; the gravity and severity of
the danger posed by the design; the likelihood of that danger; the avoidability of
the danger, i.e., the user's knowledge of the product, publicity surrounding the
danger, or the efficacy of warnings, as well as common knowledge and the
expectation of danger; the user's ability to avoid danger; the state of the art at
the time the product is manufactured; the ability to eliminate danger without
impairing the usefulness of the product or making it too expensive; and the
feasibility of spreading the loss in the setting of the product's price or by
purchasing insurance.
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to be considered by the trier of fact, Banks changes consumer expectations from a liability "ceiling"'-the maximum degree of protection
afforded the consumer-to a "floor." It may now be said that the legal
analysis starts with whether the product functioned properly in its
intended use, but beyond that, it is open to an injured plaintiff to
prove"6 1 by a host of other considerations26 2 that the defendant manufacturer made an unreasonable design choice.
One of the most tantalizing questions left unanswered by Banks2 63
is whether it heralds the abolition of the wooden 'open and obvious'
rule in failure to warn cases." The court of appeals in Ogletree v.
Navistar International Transportation Corp.265 had flirted with the
abolition of the open and obvious rule and the adoption of a form of riskbenefit analysis,2 66 but it speedily reversed itself with the en banc
decision in Weatherby v. Honda Motor Co.267 and returned to the
standard that there is no duty to warn of an obvious danger, regardless
of the availability of safer alternative designs.26 By reducing "the
user's knowledge of the product,. . . the efficacy of warnings, as well as

Banks, 264 Ga. at 736 n.6, 450 S.E.2d at 675 n.6. This list, of course, is "non-exhaustive."
Id. at 736, 450 S.E.2d at 675.
261. Banks appears to keep the burden of proving safer alternative design on the
plaintiff. See id. at 737, 450 S.E.2d at 675 ("the plaintiff's ability to adduce evidence [of]
a feasible alternative design").

This, of course, is inconsistent with one of the classic

objectives of strict products liability, which was to relieve injured plaintiffs of onerous proof
problems when the defendant manufacturer was in possession of all the relevent
information. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978); Escola v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
262. "Such diverse matters as competing cost trade-offs, tactical market decisions,
product development and research/testing demands, the idiosyncrasies of individual
corporate management styles, and federal and other regulatory restrictions can enter into
consideration of the reasonableness of a manufacturer's decision-making process." Banks,
264 Ga. at 736, 450 S.E.2d at 671.
263. Banks involved a nine-year old child who died after eating rodenticide manufactured by defendant. Plaintiffs sued both on theories of defective design and failure to
warn. The court held that the failure to warn issue was preempted by the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-36y (1988), and, hence,
did not reach that issue at all. See Banks, 264 Ga. at 737, 450 S.E.2d at 676.
264. The tortured history of the open and obvious rule in Georgia is traced in Cynthia
T. Adams, et al. Torts, 43 MERCER L. REv. 395, 422-23 (1991).
265. 194 Ga. App. 41, 390 S.E.2d 61 (1989), overruled by Weatherby v. Honda Motor
Co., 195 Ga. App. 169, 393 S.E.2d 64 (1990).
266. One focus of Ogletree's inquiry was "whether installation [of a superior safety
device] was practical, economically feasible, and technically feasible." 194 Ga. App. at 46,
390 S.E.2d at 66, which, of course, is the language of risk-utility analysis.
267. 195 Ga. App. 169, 170, 393 S.E.2d 64, 65 (1990).
268. Id.
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common knowledge and the expectation of danger"269 to but one of the
many risk-benefit factors, it would appear that Banks at least sets the
stage for plenary reconsideration of the open and obvious rule in an
appropriate case.
The court of appeals applied the "learned intermediary" rule. to
limit a manufacturer's liability in Lance v. American Edwards
2 71 Defendant manufactured a device known as a "gastric
Laboratories.
bubble," which was surgically implanted in plaintiffs stomach by her
physician. Plaintiff, who had a prior incisional hernia, brought suit for
her injuries after the device ruptured inside her, alleging that defendant
manufacturer breached a duty to warn her directly that the device
should not be inserted into a person with an incisional hernia272
In a very unusual decision involving separate opinions by all three
members of the panel,273 Lance's only common rationale for denying
a recovery against the manufacturer was that "the device and its
application at all times were under the control of the prescribing
physician .... [274] Consequently, [plaintiff's] treating physician had
sole responsibility for advising his patient of dangers associated with the
use of the gastric bubble."275 Because of this intermediary physicianpatient relationship, "[tihe conditions do not exist and the manufacturer
has no practical means to supply a patient with notice of any risks or
side effects associated with the use of its product." 7 '
The basis for disagreement in Lance was the reliance by two members
of the panel on Walker v. Jack Eckerd Corp.,277 discussed in last
year's survey article,27 which limited a pharmacist's duty to warn
about potential dangers of drugs prescribed by a physician.279 Walker,
however, did not apply the learned intermediary rule, which places
liability on the last person to deal with the plaintiff as an intermediary

269. See Banks, 264 Ga. at 736 n.6, 450 S.E.2d at 675 n.6.
270. See Carter v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &Co., 217 Ga. App. 139, 140-41,456 S.E.2d
661, 662 (1995).
271. 215 Ga. App. 713, 452 S.E.2d 185 (1994).

272. Id. at 714, 452 S.E.2d at 186.
273. "[1fthere is a special concurrence without a statement of agreement with all that
is said in the opinion.. ., the opinion is a physical precedent only." GA. CT. APP. Rule 33(a)
(1995).
274. 215 Ga. App. at 717-18, 452 S.E.2d at 188 (Smith, J., concurring).
275. Id. at 716, 452 S.E.2d at 187.
276. Id. at 717, 452 S.E.2d at 188 (Pope, C.J., concurring).
277. 209 Ga. App. 517, 434 S.E.2d 63 (1993).
278.

1994 Torts, supra note 48, at 481-82.

279. Walker, 209 Ga. App. at 522, 434 S.E.2d at 67-68 (quoting Jones v. Irvin, 602 F.
Supp. 399, 402-03 (S.D. Ill. 1985)).
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between the plaintiff and the manufacturer."' In fact, Walker reversed that rule by moving liability a step back from the last person
with an opportunity to warn the plaintiff, and it has been justifiably
criticized for doing so."'1
In a final products liability case of note, the court of appeals in
General Motors Corp. v. Moseley 2 reversed the largest punitive
damage jury award in Georgia history-$101 million-on the grounds of
prejudicial trial conduct by plaintiffs' counsel.'
Although the
lengthy opinion contains a number of interesting holdings on various
issues of interest to products liability lawyers,2" all that should be
regarded as obiter dicta in light of the reversal on the stated
grounds.8 5
B. Strict Liability
It is well established under Georgia law that a carrier of passengers
must use extraordinary diligence to protect the lives and persons of
those passengers."' In addition, this duty cannot be lessened or
absolved by any contract between the passenger and the carrier.2 7
Although the owner of a building in which an elevator is operated is not
actually a carrier of passengers by strict definition, he too is charged
with using extraordinary care in the protection of the passengers for
whom the elevator is provided."' With these standards in mind, the

280. See Hawkins v. Greenberg, 159 Ga. App. 302, 309, 283 S.E.2d 301, 307 (1981).
281. See Walker, 209 Ga. App. at 525-26, 434 S.E.2d at 70-71 (Pope, C.J., dissenting).
282. 213 Ga. App. 875, 447 S.E.2d 302 (1994).
283. The precise conduct involved was the repeated introduction into the trial of
references to incidents similar to that involving plaintiffs' decedent (side-saddle fuel tank
explosions) without making an adequate evidentiary showing of similarity, in violation of
the court's order in limine. "Plaintiffs' counsel's repeated breach of that ruling can
only be regarded as deliberate," said the court of appeals, "and considering the inflammatory nature of the references to a multitude of other lawsuits and deaths, we are unable to

say ...that the frequent violation of the trial court's ruling did not influence the jury's
verdict." Id. at 878, 447 S.E.2d at 307.
284. For example, the court of appeals stated that evidence of subsequent remedial
measures should be admissible in strict liability cases, id. at 882, 447 S.E.2d at 310, thus
adopting the minority view on that position.
285. Id. at 878, 447 S.E.2d at 307.

286. O.C.G.A. § 46-9-132 (1992); see also Mattox v. MARTA, 200 Ga. App. 697, 409
S.E.2d 267 (1991); Atlanta Transit Sys., Inc. v. Simpson, 139 Ga. App. 34, 228 S.E.2d 20

(1976).
287. See Central Ry. v. Lippman, 110 Ga. 665,36 S.E. 202 (1900); Hearn v. Central Ry.,
22 Ga. App. 1, 95 S.E. 368 (1918).

288. See Bullard v. Rolader, 152 Ga. 369, 110 S.E. 16 (1921); Grant v. Allen, 141 Ga.
106, 80 S.E. 279 (1913).
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parties in Gaffney v. EQK Realty Investors 9 asked the court to
determine if this duty owed by an elevator owner can be delegated to a
third party who has contracted to make repairs to the elevator.290
After a brief discussion of the public policies related to this issue, the
court succinctly held that "the owner of an office building ...cannot
delegate this duty [of extraordinary care] to an independent contractor
engaged to repair the elevator."291

C. Defamation
Of the many interesting defamation cases decided during the survey
period, a single representative example must suffice. One can understand the desire of plaintiff in Cox Enterprises, Inc. v. Thrasher292 to
sue for injury to her reputation. She agreed to give an interview to the
defendant newspaper reporter based on the reporter's representation
that she was investigating "a story on infertility and that plaintiff and
her husband would be characterized as a wholesome couple, successful
in their quest for a baby."93 In fact, the resultant article appeared
under a headline reading "A Close Look at a Hidden Danger...
Often
"
Symptom-Less Chlamydia Threatens the Sexually Active. 294
Although the court of appeals reluctantly29 5 allowed the plaintiff to
go to a jury, the supreme court, on certiorari, flatly repudiated her
claim. 96 Focusing on plaintiffs inability to prove whether the
sexually transmitted disease she undisputedly had was chlamydia or
not,297 the court applied the constitutional

rule of Philadelphia

Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,29 s which reverses the common-law presumption 299 by putting on the plaintiff the burden of proving the
falsity of the statement."0 "Because the fact finding process will be

289. 213 Ga. App. 653, 445 S.E.2d 771 (1994).
290. Id. at 653, 445 S.E.2d at 772.
291. Id. at 655, 445 S.E.2d at 773-74.
292. 264 Ga. 235, 442 S.E.2d 740 (1994).
293. Thrasher v. Cox Enters., Inc., 209 Ga. App. 716, 717, 434 S.E.2d 497, 498 (1993),
rev 'd,
264 Ga. 235, 442 S.E.2d 740 (1994).
294. Id. at 716, 434 S.E.2d at 498.
295. Presiding Judge Beasley concurred in the judgment only, thus robbing the opinion
of any precedential value. See supra note 273.
296. Cox, 264 Ga, at 236, 442 S.E.2d at 741.

297. Plaintiff's sexually transmitted bacteria was not identified before it was treated
with a drug used to cure chlamydia. Id. at 237, 442 S.E.2d at 741-42.
298. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
299.

See, e.g., Gilstrap v. Leith, 24 Ga. App. 720, 102 S.E. 169 (1920); Adams v.

Greeson, 16 Ga. App. 649, 85 S.E. 936 (1915).
300.

"[T]he common-law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot stand

when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of public concern."
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unable to resolve conclusively whether the speech at issue was true or
false, the burden of proof is dispositive [against plaintiff's] claim that
she was defamed by the publication intimating she had contracted
chlamydia." °1
The problem with the supreme court's decision in Thrasheris that it
fails to consider further whether plaintiff was defamed by the intimation
that she was "sexually active.""°2 After all, one does not have to be
sexually active in the sense of promiscuity in order to contract a venereal
disease (Mr. Herring got it from his wife 3 ), and since Georgia does
not adhere to the doctrine of mitior sensus3 °4 in defamation law,' °
a jury should have determined whether plaintiff, a private figure,3 "°
was defamed by the implication that she was promiscuous.3 7
D.

Mental Abuse

Infliction of Emotional Distress. The four elements of the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress are: "(1) The conduct must be
intentional or reckless; (2) The conduct must be extreme and outrageous;
(3) There must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and
0
the emotional distress; (4) The emotional distress must be severe."
The height of this judicial wall may be measured by the fact that, during
the survey period, the court denied recovery to a mother whose stillborn
baby was autopsied under confusing circumstances 30 and to a former

PhiladelphiaNewspapers, 475 U.S. at 777.
301. Cox, 264 Ga. at 237, 442 S.E.2d at 742.
302. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
304. Under the ancient mitior sensus rule, if words could be construed as either
defamatory or nondefamatory, the court was required to give them the nondefamatory
meaning. See, e.g., Wardlaw v. Peck, 318 S.E.2d 270, 273 (S.C. App. 1984).
305. "A publication claimed to be defamatory must be read and construed in the sense
in which the readers to whom it is addressed would ordinarily understand it." Fiske v.
Stockton, 171 Ga. App. 601, 602, 320 S.E.2d 590, 593 (1984) (quoting Ledger-Enquirer Co.
v. Brown, 214 Ga. 422, 423, 105 S.E.2d 229, 231 (1958)).
306. Public figures are held to the more demanding "actual malice" standard of New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,279-80 (1964). See Gardner v. Boatright, 216 Ga.
App. 755, 455 S.E.2d 847 (1995); Terrell v. Georgia Television Co., 215 Ga. App. 150, 449
S.E.2d 897 (1994).
307. See Brooks v. Stone, 170 Ga. App. 457, 317 S.E.2d 277 aff'd, 253 Ga. 565, 322
S.E.2d 728 (1984).
308. Phillips v. Pacific & S. Co., 215 Ga. App. 513, 515, 451 S.E.2d 100, 102 (1994)
(quoting Bridges v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, 176 Ga. App. 227, 230, 335 S.E.2d 445, 447-48
(1985)); Clark v. Arras, 212 Ga. App. 695, 696, 443 S.E.2d 277, 278 (1994).
309. Clark, 212 Ga.App. at 695, 443 S.E.2d at 278.
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television news reporter whose employers made false accusations about
him in connection with his employment.81
Invasion of Privacy. Plaintiff in Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v.
Kubach, n an AIDS patient, won a $500,000 jury verdict on his claim
that defendant improperly digitized his face for the first seven seconds
of a television interview, thus allowing his identifiable image to be
broadcast for that amount of time. 12 Holding that this was an
actionable public disclosure of embarassing private facts about plaintiff,
the court concluded that he had not waived his right to privacy by prior
disclosures of his disease to "family, friends, medical personnel and
members of his support group."313 Presiding Judge Beasley concurred
on the grounds that, in this case, the plaintiff had not waived his
expectation of privacy: "Telling one hundred members of a confidential
support group may retain its private nature for the purposes of this tort,
one newspaper reporter would give it a decidedly public
whereas telling
14
nature."3

Malicious Prosecution. Answering a certified question from the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the supreme court in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Blackford315 held, as a matter of first impression in
Georgia, that evidence of the tort plaintiff's guilt in fact of the
underlying criminal act is admissible as a defense to the plaintiff's
damages.31 " Although this holding attempts to advance the policy that
"citizens are encouraged to bring to justice those who are apparently
guilty,"31 ' it actually shifts the focus of the malicious prosecution
action from the subjective intent of the prosecutor at the time the
underlying criminal case was commenced318 to an objective, after-thefact inquiry that will turn every malicious prosecution case into a trial
within a trial of the underlying criminal charge. This would appear to
have little to do with the public purpose of malicious prosecution actions,
which is to protect the criminal processes of this state from being used

310. Phillips, 215 Ga. App. at 517, 451 S.E.2d at 103.
311. 212 Ga. App. 707, 443 S.E.2d 491 (1994) (en banc).
312. Id. at 707, 443 S.E.2d at 493.
313. Id. at 709, 443 S.E.2d at 494.
314. Id, at 718, 443 S.E.2d at 500.
315. 264 Ga. 612, 449 S.E.2d 293 (1994).
316. Id. at 614, 449 S.E.2d at 295.
317. Id.
318. See, e.g., Monroe v. Sigler, 256 Ga. 759, 353 S.E.2d 23 (1987); Hartshorne v.
Smith, 104 Ga. 235, 30 S.E. 666 (1898); Fisher v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, 175 Ga. App.
542, 333 S.E.2d 877 (1985); Ayala v. Sherrer, 135 Ga. App. 431, 218 S.E.2d 84 (1975).
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as a vent for private malice. The ultimate guilt or innocence of the
accused may have little or no relevance to the prosecutor's malice if the
prosecutor acted entirely without knowledge of or reference to such guilt
or innocence. 19
E. Seduction
Until the supreme court's decision in Franklin v. Hill,320 parents in
Georgia were given a civil cause of action for the seduction of their
unmarried daughters. 2 1 The court's ruling in that case, however,
declared the seduction statute unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds since liability under it applied only to men. In addition, the
court declined to amend the offensive statute by extending its liability
to women. 2
Fraud
There seemed to be more than the usual number of cases during this
survey period in which the appellate court determined that the issue of
fraud323 should be decided by a jury rather than upon summary
judgment. Three such cases dealt with questions of fact concerning
outright misrepresentations made by the defendants 324 or representaF

319. Another interesting problem Blackford creates is the quantum of proof required.
Although in the underlying case, of course, the guilt of the accused would have to be
established beyond a reasonable doubt, in a civil case, the quantum of proof is only a
preponderance of the evidence. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 657, cmt. b (1977).
Thus, Blackford creates the anomalous potential for allowing the malicious prosecution jury
to find an accused "guilty" of charges that could not have been proved against him in the
underlying criminal case.
320. 264 Ga. 302, 444 S.E.2d 778 (1994).
321. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-16 (1982).
322. 264 Ga. at 305, 444 S.E.2d at 781.
323. In general, the elements of fraud specifically include a false representation,
knowledge that the representation was false when made, the intent to induce action or
inaction by reliance on the representation, justifiable reliance on the representation, and
damage as a result of relying on the representation. See GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 16,
§ 32-1.
Concerning when disclosures must be made, it should be noted that there is no duty to
disclose facts of which the other party already has knowledge. See Butts v. Southern
Clays, Inc., 215 Ga. 110, 450 S.E.2d 244 (1994).
324. Statements made intentionally or recklessly with the intent to deceive constitute
actual fraud. See Hahne v. Wylly, 199 Ga. App. 811,406 S.E.2d 94 (1991); Alford v. Oliver,
169 Ga. App. 865, 315 S.E.2d 299 (1984). When a plaintiff, however, does not actually
believe the false representations made to him, there can be no actionable fraud. See J&J
Materials, Inc. v. Conyers Seafood Co., 214 Ga. App. 63, 446 S.E.2d 781 (1994).
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tions upon which the plaintiffs legally could rely.325 In both Rivers v.
BMW of North America, Inc.3 26 and Lister v. Scriver3 27 the court
found that there was ample evidence from which a jury could find that
fraudulent misrepresentations were made to the respective plaintiffs. 28 Such evidence in Rivers included the fact that the BMW
automobile which plaintiff purchased from one of the defendants had
been represented to her as new, when, in actuality, it had been damaged
by acid rain and repainted. Further, when plaintiff noticed flaws in the
paint and questioned them, she was told that the vehicle had not been
repainted.129 Likewise, there was evidence in Lister which could
establish that defendant represented to plaintiffs individually that they
were to be the only other stockholders (besides himself) in a retail
clothing establishment and then obtained money from plaintiffs
ostensibly to purchase a franchise for the business and incorporate it,
when in fact such monies were diverted to other business interests of the
defendant.330
In Salmon v. Pearson & Associates,"1 defendant surveyor was hired
to prepare a flood certification necessary for plaintiffs loan closing in
conjunction with plaintiffs purchase of certain real estate. Defendant
rendered the opinion that the house was not in a flood zone, and four
months after the plaintiff moved in the house, it sustained extensive
flood water damage. Defendant contended, and the trial court agreed,
that the evidence did not indicate anyone would rely on defendant's
representations concerning the flood status of the property.33 2 The
court of appeals reversed and specifically stated that
[t]his is not a case of blind reliance on the seller's representations
regarding a matter of title, which with proper diligence should have

325. For actionable fraud the harmed party must have a justifiable right to rely and
must have actually relied upon the misrepresentations made to him. See Steimer v.
Northside Bldg. Supply Co., 202 Ga. App. 843, 415 S.E.2d 688 (1992); Alpha Kappa Psi
Bldg. Corp. v. Kennedy, 90 Ga. App. 587, 83 S.E.2d 580 (1954).
326. 214 Ga. App. 880, 449 S.E.2d 337 (1994).
327. 216 Ga. App. 741, 456 S.E.2d 83 (1995).
328. Rivers, 214 Ga. App. at 884, 449 S.E.2d at 341; Lister, 216 Ga. App. at 745, 456
S.E.2d at 87.
329. 214 Ga. App. at 881, 883, 449 S.E.2d at 338-39, 340.
330. 216 Ga. App. at 745, 456 S.E.2d at 86-87. The case of El-Amin v. Nalley Motor
Trucks, 215 Ga. App. 509, 451 S.E.2d 61 (1994), decided during the survey period, held that
the mileage on a truck plaintiff purchased had not been misrepresented since plaintiff had
signed a statement at the time of purchase which indicated that the odometer reading did
not represent the actual mileage. Id. at 510, 451 S.E.2d at 62.
331. 214 Ga. App. 11, 446 S.E.2d 762 (1994).
332. Id. at 12, 446 S.E.2d at 764.
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been investigated through title survey ... but rather a case of reliance
on professional opinion, regarding flooding, which the buyer was not
bound as a matter of law to challenge by independent inquiry."'
Generally a fraud claim cannot be predicated upon a misrepresentation concerning a future event unless there is knowledge at the time that
the event will not take place.3 4 Howard v. Hammond3.5 presented
a jury question concerning the exception to this rule. The court found
that there was evidence which could support plaintiffs claim that
defendant had no intention of including a certain insurance agency
contract in a partnership agreement entered into between plaintiff and
defendant, since defendant's agency contract stated that it would
terminate upon the sale of the business unless certain other conditions
were met.336 For businesses, the contents of their files and previous
documents may provide the scientier element for a claim of fraudulent
concealment, as illustrated by the case of WMI Urban Services, Inc. v.
Erwin."7 In that case, defendant issued a termite inspection report
on plaintiffs' home which showed past infestation but no evidence of
damage. Plaintiffs thereafter discovered a vast amount of termite
damage in their newly-purchased home. 3 The court found that since
defendant possessed a previous inspection report showing termite
damage four years earlier but nothing indicating the damage had been
repaired, a jury could find that defendant submitted a fraudulent report
to plaintiffs. 3 9
When a purchaser of personal property elects to affirm a contract that
contains disclaimer provisions which eliminate any prior representations
made to him not contained in the contract, he is generally thereafter
precluded from making any assertions that he relied on any of the

333. Id. at 14, 446 S.E.2d at 765. Other cases decided during the survey period that
dealt with the issue of fraud in which it was determined that there could be no justifiable
reliance on the part of the plaintiffs included: Cobb County Sch. Dist. v. MAT Factory,
Inc., 215 Ga. App. 697, 452 S.E.2d 140 (1994) (even though disparate test results were
available to plaintiff concerning safe fall heights of playground surface material, plaintiff
chose not to perform any tests of its own); Smith v. McClung, 215 Ga. App. 786, 452 S.E.2d
229 (1994) (plaintiff did nothing to ascertain actual title status of land before building
house); Jung v. Cheoun, 216 Ga. App. 490, 455 S.E.2d 310 (1995) (plaintiff did nothing to
inquire about financial status of business before purchasing it).
334. See Philips Medical Sys. N. Am. Co. v. Diagnostic Equip. Servs., Inc., 213 Ga. App.
236, 444 S.E.2d 345 (1994); Wheeling v. Ring Radio Co., 213 Ga. App. 210, 444 S.E.2d 144
(1994).
335. 216 Ga. App. 703, 455 S.E.2d 390 (1995).
336. Id. at 706, 455 S.E.2d at 392.
337. 215 Ga. App. 357, 450 S.E.2d 830 (1994).
338. Id. at 357, 450 S.E.2d at 831.
339. Id. at 359, 450 S.E.2d at 832.
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seller's alleged previous misrepresentations.3 40 As illustrated by the
decision in Reaugh v. Inner HarbourHospital, Ltd., this principle is
not applicable when plaintiffs claim of fraud is predicated upon the
representation that services called for under an agreement would be
provided and that plaintiff had been charged for services not rendered. 42 Likewise, in Stricker v. Epstein,343 the court found that the
fraud plaintiffs alleged was involved in the inducement of a stock
purchase, while the document containing the disclaimer provision
reflected a different aspect of the parties' negotiations.3 4 Under
these circumstances, plaintiffs were allowed to pursue their fraud claim
against defendants.34 5 Finally, concerning fraudulent transfers of
property, the court in Blankenship v. West Georgia Plumbing Supply,
Inc.3 46 determined that a husband-to-wife property transfer is not
fraudulent when it is done for the purpose of debt payment to the wife,
and the property so transferred is in reasonable proportion to the debt
owed. 47 In such cases, the husband may prefer such payment to the
wife over payment to any other unsecured creditor.34 s
G. Tortious Interference with Business or ContractualRelations
As the heading of this section suggests, there are two separate, but
closely related, causes of action in Georgia that involve the nonprivileged3 49 interference with a valuable economic relationship. 30

The

elements the two torts have in common are as follows: A plaintiff must
show the following: "The defendant (1) acted improperly and without
privilege, (2) purposely and with malice with the intent to injure, (3)
induced a third party or parties not to enter into or continue a business
relationship with the plaintiff, and (4) for which the plaintiff suffered

340. See Hightower v. Century 21 Farish Realty, 214 Ga. App. 522, 448 S.E.2d 271
(1994); see also GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 16, § 32-4.
341. 214 Ga. App. 259, 447 S.E.2d 617 (1994).
342. Id. at 262, 447 S.E.2d at 620.
343. 213 Ga. App. 226, 444 S.E.2d 91 (1994).
344. Id. at 228, 444 S.E.2d at 93-94.
345. Id. at 228, 444 S.E.2d at 93-94.
346. 213 Ga. App. 275, 444 S.E.2d 596 (1994).
347. Id. at 277, 444 S.E.2d at 597-98.
348. Id. at 277, 444 S.E.2d at 597-98.
349. As, for example, by one who is a stranger to the contract. See, e.g., Johnson v.
Rogers, 214 Ga. App. 557, 448 S.E.2d 710 (1994); Hyre v. Denise, 214 Ga. App. 552, 449
S.E.2d 120 (1994).
350. Georgia also recognizes a cause of action for tortious interference with possessory
interests. See Hamil v. Stanford, 264 Ga. 801, 449 S.E.2d 118 (1994).
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some financial injury."351 In Renden, Inc. v. Liberty Real Estate Ltd.
PartnershipIII,52 however, the court iterated that there is at least one
key difference between the two: "Tortious interference with business
relations is a distinct and separate tort from that of tortious interference
with contractual relations, although some of the elements of the two
torts are similar."' 3 The court stressed that "liability results not only
from disruption of the relationship but also from elimination of the
injured party's ability to perform.""64 Thus, although "[piroof of a
valid and enforceable contract is not required as an element of a cause
of action for intentional tortious interference with business relations";. 5 nevertheless, "plaintiff must demonstrate that absent the
interference,
those relations were reasonably likely to develop in
6
fact.,"

35

V.

DAMAGES

The supreme court in Martin v. Hospital Authority,357 granted
certiorari to last year's court of appeals decision in that case3 55 to
review the issue of hospital authority liability for punitive damages.
Finding the lower appellate court to be correct in its ruling that punitive
damages cannot be awarded against a hospital authority, the high court
also stated that this decision is unaffected by the existence of any
insurance policy under which the authority might be covered. 59
During this survey period the court of appeals also dealt with several
procedural questions concerning the pursuit of punitive damages. In
Willis v. Lisle,"' the trial court determined that the jury's punitive
damage award of $175,000 to plaintiff was excessive and reduced the
amount to $90,000, but did not give defendants the opportunity to reject
the lowered figure.3" 1 The court of appeals found this procedure to be

351. Valdez v. Power Indus. Consultants, Inc., 215 Ga. App. 444, 447, 451 S.E.2d 87,
90 (1994) (quoting Arford v. Blalock, 199 Ga. App. 434, 440, 405 S.E.2d 698, 704 (1991),
aff'd sub nom. 262 Ga. 95, 414 S.E.2d 1 (1992)); Lykins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 214
Ga. App. 577, 579, 448 S.E.2d 716, 718 (1994) (quoting Green v. Johnston Realty, Inc., 212
Ga. App. 656, 659-60, 442 S.E.2d 843, 846 (1994)).
352. 213 Ga. App. 333, 444 S.E.2d 814 (1994).
353. Id. at 334, 444 S.E.2d at 817.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 335, 444 S.E.2d at 817.
357. 264 Ga. 626, 449 S.E.2d 827 (1994).
358. Hospital Auth. v. Martin, 210 Ga. App. 893, 438 S.E.2d 103 (1993). See 1994
Torts, supra note 48, at 513.
359. 264 Ga. at 627, 449 S.E.2d at 828-29.
360. 215 Ga. App. 191, 450 S.E.2d 826 (1994).
361. Id. at 191-92, 450 S.E.2d at 827,
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incorrect pursuant to Georgia Code section 51-12-12,362 which permits
a trial judge to raise or lower a clearly inadequate or excessive punitive
damages award, but also "envisions that any party may reject the
damage award ... which is substituted for the jury verdict." 63 In
applicable situations, Georgia law allows the introduction of subsequent
guilty pleas to driving under the influence offenses as evidence for
punitive damages purposes"' and also allows evidence of criminal
punishment for such offenses in mitigation of the civil damages
36 expanded this rule by
award.365 The court in Cheevers v. Clark
allowing the jury to hear evidence of defendant's subsequent incidents
of driving under the influence that had not yet been resolved through
criminal proceedings, as long as defendant was permitted to plead and
prove the statutory penalties associated with the alleged offenses. 67
An award of punitive damages cannot stand if the evidence is insufficient to support it. 36 s When, however, as in Multimedia WMAZ, Inc.

362. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-12 (1982 & Supp. 1995).
363. 215 Ga. App. at 192, 450 S.E.2d at 827. The proper procedure in this case would
have been for the trial court, once it had determined the alternative punitive damages
amount, to have given both parties the opportunity to reject the alternative amount. Upon
either party rejecting the substituted verdict, the trial court must grant a new trial or
grant a new trial only on the damages issue. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-12 (1982 & Supp. 1995);
Spence v. Hilliard, 260 Ga. 107, 389 S.E.2d 753 (1990).
364. See Moore v. Thompson, 255 Ga. 236, 336 S.E.2d 749 (1985).
365. See Cherry v. McCall, 23 Ga. 193 (1857); White v. Taylor, 157 Ga. App. 328, 227
S.E.2d 321 (1981).
366. 214 Ga. App. 866, 449 S.E.2d 528 (1994).
367. Id. at 870, 449 S.E.2d at 531.
368. "Punitive damages may be awarded only in such tort actions in which it is proven
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's actions showed willful misconduct,
malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the
presumption of conscious indifference to consequences." O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(b) (Supp.
1995); see also Kaplan v. Sanders, 237 Ga. 132, 227 S.E.2d 38 (1976); Southern Ry. v.
O'Bryan, 119 Ga. 147, 455 S.E. 1000 (1903). The evidence presented did not authorize
an award of punitive damages in the following survey period cases: Fulton v. Anchor Say.
Bank, FSB, 215 Ga. App. 456, 452 S.E.2d 208 (1994) (wrongful repossession
claim--evidence that collateral was returned to plaintiff and defendants were not abusive
or profane at time of repossession); Tifton Bank & Trust Co. v. Knight's Furniture Co.,
215 Ga. App. 471, 452 S.E.2d 219 (1994) (conversion action-bank relied on implied
authority of attorney to endorse check); Bradford v. Xerox Corp., 216 Ga. App. 83, 453
S.E.2d 98 (1994) (evidence of speeding, crossing highway median, and striking plaintiff's
vehicle without history of other driving problems was insufficient to support punitive
damages award). In Martin v. Williams, 215 Ga. App. 649, 451 S.E.2d 822 (1994), the
court found in this dental malpractice action that evidence of defendant's continued
treatment of plaintiff during a time when defendant abused unprescribed, addictive drugs
would justify the jury's imposition of punitive damages. Id. at 651, 451 S.E.2d at 825.
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v. Kubach,369 the trial is properly bifurcated in relation to the various
damages awards and the jury is properly instructed thereon,7 0 a
reversal of a general damages award is not required when the evidence
is lacking in support of the punitive damages award. 7'
In Knox Enterprises v. Timbermen, Inc.,372 timber growing on
plaintiff's land was partially destroyed by wildfires caused by one of
defendant's employees. Plaintiff then sought damages in the amount
of the present value of the future growth of the damaged trees, which
had to be harvested early and sold.3 7' The court of appeals found that
there was no legal basis for such a recovery and further opined that the
proper measure of damages for the timber was the difference between
the timber's value before the fire and the state in which the fire left
it. 374

Pursuant to Georgia law, when a plaintiff makes a statutory

demand to a defendant for the accrual of prejudgment interest, such a
demand must be made directly to the person against whom the claim is
being made. 37 5 Notice to a defendant's insurer alone is not deemed
sufficient37 unless defendant's insurer has previously specifically
directed plaintiff to direct all correspondence to it as in Hewett v.
377 Under such circumstances, a defendant is estopped from
Carter.
demanding this strict compliance with the statute.378
VI. CONCLUSION

These authors have for several years concluded their articles with a
few philosophical words on the art of survey writing in general. 79
369. 212 Ga. App. 707, 443 S.E.2d 491 (1994).
370. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(d) (Supp. 1995).
371. 212 Ga. App. at 711, 443 S.E.2d at 495. In such cases the punitive damages
award may be written off and the general damages award will stand. Id. at 711-12, 443
S.E.2d at 495.
372. 215 Ga. App. 390, 450 S.E.2d 834 (1994).
373. Id. at 390, 450 S.E.2d at 835.
374. Id. at 393, 450 S.E.2d at 837; see also Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Murray, 93
Ga. 256, 20 S.E. 129 (1894).
375. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14 (Supp. 1995).
376. See Martin v. Williams, 215 Ga. App. 649, 451 S.E.2d 822 (1994).
377. 215 Ga. App. 429, 450 S.E.2d 843 (1994).
378. Id. at 430, 450 S.E.2d at 844.
379. See, e.g., 1994 Torts, supra note 48, at 516 (comparing law survey to Shakespearean drama); 1993 Torts, supranote 47, at 475 (reflecting on necessity for winnowing survey
cases); Cynthia T. Adams, et al., Torts 44 MERCER L. REv. 375,420 (1992) (Georgia Survey
compared to Lawrence Welk's Champagne Music ("wunnerful, wunnerful")); see also
Charles R. Adams III & Cynthia Trimboli Adams, Torts, 40 MERCER L. REv. 377, 422
(1988) (reflecting on tort law in general as transforming "lamentation into litigation"). Cf
Charles R. Adams III, Domestic Relations, 35 MERCER L. REV. 127, 144-45 (domestic
relations law overlays turmoil-ridden fields of human existence; "[flar beneath it all, the
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Certainly, there are others who are eminently more qualified to comment
on these matters than we are,"m and one of the greatest thinkers in
the area of law reviews in general was Professor Karl Llewellyn, whose
paean to law review editors was featured in these pages last year.38 '
This year, we would like to "show the flag" a little, and conclude with a
condign explanation by Llewellyn, from his masterpiece The Bramble
Bush," 2 about our editors' unique role in the preservation of "truth,
justice, and the American way" :383
We have in law schools an aristocracy of a peculiar kind. We may
almost say it is a perfect aristocracy. One achieves membership
exclusively in terms of his performance. Membership carries honor,
but the honor that it carries is the duty to work and slave and drive
oneself as no other student is expected to. A perfect aristocracy, then,
because continued membership is based on higher performance than is

demanded of non-members. Now this law review is a scientific
publication, on which in good part the reputation of the school depends.
Here is a thing American. Here is a thing Americans may well be
proud of. There is not so far as I know in the world an academic

faculty which pins its reputation before the public upon the work of
undergraduate students-there is none, that is, except in the American
law reviews. Such an institution it is a privilege to serve. Such an
institution it is an honor to belong to. And by virtue of the terms of
tenure of office, of this you may be sure: to earn that honor is to earn
an education. I hold out before you, then, as the goal of highest
achievement in your first year, this chance to enter on real training in
your second. 384

ancient torrents rage").
380. See R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Law: A Reflection on Thirty
Surveys, 46 MERCER L. REv. 1 (1994).
381. See Karl Llewellyn, "Song of the Law Review," 1994 Torts, supra note 47, at 516.
382. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1951).
383. See, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231, 236 (2d
Cir. 1983); DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 113
(N.D. Ga. 1984).
384. LLEWELLYN, supra note 382, at 105 (emphasis in original).

